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I. INTRODUCTION
Like many hard-working Americans, Karen Winkler had no time to be
tired. The year was 2004, and the young mother of three had just recently
been diagnosed with multiple sclerosis.' Ms. Winkler struggled with the
devastating effects of the disease, often suffering from extreme fatigue and
pain, and desperately needed medication to combat her symptoms so she
2could properly care for her children. Enter Provigil (modafinil), a powerful
brand-name pharmaceutical drug that treats fatigue in multiple sclerosis
patients.3 For Ms. Winkler, the drug was perfect-she was back on her feet
and able to care for her children.4 There was just one catch: this stuff was
.5
expensive.
Like many hard-working Americans, Ms. Winkler constantly worried
about her health care costs and their impact on her family's financial well-
being.6 She was paying $300 for a six-month supply of Provigil, and with
three children to raise, it was anathema to consider dipping into the family
savings and their 401k so that she could continue to afford the medication;
yet, this was the reality Ms. Winkler faced. Not to fear, her doctor
proclaimed, because Provigil was expected to go generic soon possibly
even within the year.8 Access to this generic form, her doctor told her, would
save Ms. Winkler and her family over $1,000 each year.9 Yet, all of a
sudden, Provigil did not go generic.'0 Instead, the price of Provigil
1. Megan Thompson, Are Generic Drugs Being Delayed to the Market, PBS (June 28,
2014), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/generic-drugs-delayed-market.
2. Id.
3. See id (noting that Provigil was one of the few drugs on the market used to treat
fatigue that had minimal side effects); see also TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC.,
MEDICATION GUIDE (2015) (used to treat excessive sleepiness).
4. Thompson, supra note 1.
5. Id. Provigil's profits for the year 2005 the year Ms. Winkler began taking the
brand-name medicine were $475 million. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See id; see also Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Settlement of Cephalon Pay for
Delay Case Ensures $1.2 Billion in Ill-Gotten Gains Relinquished; Refunds Will Go To
Purchasers Affected By Anticompetitive Tactics (May 28, 2015) (explaining Provigil was
owned by Cephalon, Inc., a massive biopharmaceutical company that manufactured brand-
name pharmaceuticals); Anne Urda, FTC Taps Cephalon Again Over Provigil Deal, LAW360
(March 23, 2007), http://www.law360.com/articles/21183/ftc-taps-cephalon-again-over-
provigil-deal (discussing FDA asking Cephalon for more information about the deal).
9. Thompson, supra note 1.
10. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, supra note 8. In 2006, Cephalon entered
into an agreement with four generic drug companies and paid them a total of $300 million to
stay off of the market until 2012. Id.
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skyrocketed." By 2010, Ms. Winkler was paying over $700 for a six-month
supply of Provigil.12 Feeling guilty about the impact of this cost on her
family, Ms. Winkler decided to stop taking Provigil, resorting instead to a
generic version of a different drug that failed to combat her fatigue and
actually worsened her other symptoms associated with multiple sclerosis.'3
Ms. Winkler, like many hard-working Americans, had to pick her poison
either face a life-altering disease alone or bring financial ruin to her family.
When Provigil finally went generic in 2012, its price immediately
plummeted.14 The price of a six-month supply of Provigil fell from $700-
the price Ms. Winkler faced with no available generic-to $16.15 So why
were generic competitors to Provigil delayed from entering the market for a
full seven years? The answer is simple and unsatisfactory: the market
functionality of Provigil was driven by a pay-for-delay agreement.
Reverse payment patent settlements, colloquially referred to as "pay-for-
delay" agreements, affect consumers of pharmaceutical drugs like Ms.
Winkler each and every day. The number of pay-for-delay agreements in
effect within the United States has skyrocketed since 2004. '7 In 2004, there
were no recorded settlements of patent litigation that involved a settlement
including a "pay-for-delay" structure." In 2012, this number jumped to 40
pay-for-delay agreements.19 While a United States Supreme Court decision20
11. See Thompson, supra note 1 ("It was six-something a pill. And then it was seven-





16. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, supra note 8. In 2012, Cephalon, Inc. (by this
point owned by Teva Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd.) entered into a settlement with the FTC
for a total of $1.2 billion to compensate consumers like Ms. Winkler who suffered from the
anticompetitive effects of Cephalon's pay-for-delay agreement it entered into in 2006. Id
17. See BUREAU OF COMPETITION, AGREEMENTS FILLED WITH THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND MODERNIZATION




19. Id. An important distinction to make is that not all settlements involving this type of
patent litigation also involve a pay-for-delay structure. Id This Note focuses exclusively on
settlements that do involve a pay-for-delay structure because they have the highest probability
of causing anticompetitive effects. Thus, these 21 final settlements referenced in the text
explicitly involve pay for delay because they contain the following two features: (1) explicit
compensation from a brand manufacturer to a generic manufacturer; and (2) a restriction on
the generic manufacturer's ability to market its product in competition with the branded
product.
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in 2013 has slowed the formation of these agreements in recent years, there
were still 21 pay-for-delay agreements formed in 2014.21 The continued
presence of these agreements not only affects individual consumers like Ms.
Winkler, but also state governments as well.22 Specifically, pay-for-delay
agreements force state governments to bear the brunt of the same
monopolistic market conditions as consumers thereby causing them to spend
23massive amounts of money on prescription drugs. For instance, South
24Carolina spent about $4.8 billion on Medicaid in 2012. This is over $1
25billion more than it spent on Medicaid in 2000.
The term "pay-for-delay" refers to a general practice of brand-name
drug companies wherein the brand and generic drug companies agree to
settle the patent litigation at issue with a "reverse payment" from the brand
26company to its generic competitor(s). In exchange for this payment, the
generic competitor agrees to delay entry of its lower-cost alternative into the
marketplace.27 To encourage generic drug companies to challenge weak or
invalid brand-name patents, Congress has afforded the first generic company
to file a successful Abbreviated New Drug Application ("ANDA")
challenging such a patent often coined the "first-filing generic" with a
lucrative 180 days of market exclusivity during which no other generic drug
may enter that segment of the market.28 Along with its ANDA, the generic
drug company must declare that its drug does not infringe on the brand-
29name company's patent, or that the patent itself is invalid. When this
20. Id. at n.2. This case is F.T.C v. Actavis, Inc. discussed extensively below. In short,
this landmark case changed the perceived legality of pay-for-delay agreements by holding that
such agreements can have anticompetitive effects and may sometimes violate federal antitrust
law. 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2232 (2013).
21. BUREAU OF COMPETITION, supra note 17. The most recent year in which the FTC
had available data on the prevalence of pay-for-delay agreements is 2014. Id.
22. How the Federal Trade Commission Works to Promote Competition and Benefit
Consumers in a Dynamic Economy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition
Policy and Consumer Rights of the H Comm. on the Judiciary 4 (2010) (statement of Jon
Leibowitz, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n). This report was prepared by the FTC in 2010 to
be presented to the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on
Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights. Id.
23. See THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS & THE JOHN D. AND CATHERINE T.
MACARTHUR FOUNDATION, STATE HEALTH CARE SPENDING ON MEDICAID: A 50-STATE
STUDY OF TRENDS AND DRIVERS OF COST 33 (2014).
24. Id.
2 5. Id.




29. Id. at 1014 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 505(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2014)).
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HEALTH LAW
occurs, the brand-name drug company can then challenge the generic
company's declaration and file a patent infringement suit against it. 30
However, to avoid the costs and uncertainty of the patent litigation, in which
the brand-name company loses at a disproportionate rate,3' and to safeguard
its monopolization of the market, the brand-name company will often choose
to settle the patent dispute via a pay-for-delay agreement with the generic
32drug company.
These agreements thus allow the brand-name drug companies to keep
their weak patents intact and stifle generic competition by paying
competitors to delay entry of their lower-cost alternatives into the
marketplace in exchange for a large payment. The generic ompany at issue
benefits as well because it receives a reverse payment that is larger in size
than the profits it would have reaped had it foregone the agreement and
immediately taken advantage of the duopoly granted by its 180-day period
of market exclusivity.33 Importantly, the generic company does not much
care when it can use its 180-day period of market exclusivity even if it is at
the end of a long agreement-as long as it receives a large reverse payment
to justify delayed entry. This is because no other generic drug may enter the
market until the first-filing generic has used its period of market
exclusivity.34 Thus, the first-filing generic can, at the end of the pay-for-
30. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 505()(5)(B)(iii) (2014)).
31. FED. TRADE COMM'N, PAY-FOR-DELAY: How DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST
CONSUMERS BILLIONS 3 (2010) [hereinafter PAY-FOR-DELAY]. In 2002, the FTC issued a
study noting that generic companies prevailed in 73% of the patent litigation that ended with a
decision by the court. Id. Put differently, courts generally find, at a disproportionate rate, that
the brand-name patent is invalid or that the generic drug does not infringe upon the patent. Id.
This fact further encourages brand-name companies to enter into these pay-for-delay
agreements. Id
32. See HUTT, supra note 26, at 1014-16.
33. See, e.g., In re Cipro Cases I & II, 61 Cal. 4th 116, 132-33, 348 P.3d 845, 852
(2015), reh'g denied (July 8, 2015). In 1997, the brand-name manufacturer Bayer AG paid
generic drug manufacturer Barr Pharmaceuticals and three other generic companies $398
million to delay entry of its lower-cost generic drug and protect almost $1 billion in sales. See
also Ashley Milano, California Cipro Class Action Lawsuit Settlement, ToP CLASS ACTIONS
(August 26, 2016), https://topclassactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/lawsuit-news/343055-
california-cipro-class-action-lawsuit-settlement. This payment likely exceeded the profits Barr
would have reaped had it forgone entering into the agreement and instead chose to take
advantage of the duopoly created by the 180-day market exclusivity period, during which only
the brand and first-filing generic are able to market their drugs. See In re Cipro Cases I & II,
61 Cal. at 132-33, 348 P.3d at 852.
34. See HUTT, supra note 26, at 1014.
2017] 693
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delay agreement, use its 180-day market exclusivity period.35 From this it is
clear that while the brand-name drug company and generic companies win in
a pay-for-delay agreement, consumers take a heavy loss at the back-end,
often paying 70% more3 6 for life-altering drugs that they desperately need.
Indeed, the economic impact of these reverse settlement agreements on
consumers is staggering. For example, a report found that restricting generic
access to South Carolina consumers has a devastating impact on their
finances, as generic prescription medicines saved South Carolinians $3.7
billion in 2015.37 Specifically, these savings break down into the following
amounts and categories for the state of South Carolina in 2015: (1) $356.8
million saved on Medicaid expenses; (2) $1.268 billion saved on Medicare
Part D expenses; (3) $235.9 million in cash savings; and (4) $1.933 billion
in savings on commercial insurance plans.38 On a national level, economists
with the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") estimated in 2010 that reverse
39settlement agreements cost consumers an average of $3.5 billion per year.
On a purely micro level-i.e. from the perspective of an individual
consumer the FTC has reported that the price of a generic drug, with the
presence of multiple generic competitors in the marketplace, can drop more
than 90% below what the brand-name drug company was able to initially
charge with full market exclusivity.40
Despite drug manufacturers' persistent claims to the contrary, reverse
settlement agreements are not always a legal business practice. The United
States Supreme Court stated as much in the landmark case decided in 2013,
35. Robin Feldman & Evan Frondorf, Drug Wars: A New Generation of Generic
Pharmaceutical Delay, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 502 (forthcoming 2016) (citing 21 U.S.C.
§ 355j)(5)(B)(iv) (2012)).
36. FED. TRADE COMM'N, GENERIC DRUGS AND Low-CoST PRESCRIPTIONS (2012),
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0063-generic-drugs-and-low-cost-prescriptions
[hereinafter GENERIC DRUGS].
37. GENERIC PHARM. Ass'N, 2016 GENERIC DRUG SAVINGS & ACCESS IN THE UNITED
STATES REPORT 17 (2016), http://www.gphaonline.org/media/generic-drug-savings-
2016/index.html. This same report stated that, nationwide, savings on generic prescription
medicines were $227 billion. Id
38. Id.
39. Jon Leibowitz, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, "Pay-for-Delay" Settlements in the
Pharmaceutical Industry: How Congress can Stop Anticompetitive Conduct, Protect
Consumers' Wallets, and Help Pay for Health Care Reform (The $35 Billion Solution) at the
Center for American Progress (June 23, 2009), http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz/090623
payfordelayspeech.pdf.
40. Id at 3. For example, a month's supply of the generic version of the anti-ulcer drug
Zantac (ranitidine) costs $3, while a month's supply of the brand-name product costs $111. Id.
Similarly, consumers could spend a mere $12 per month to lower their cholesterol with the
generic version of Zocor (simvastatin), or have to pay $164 for the brand-name version. Id.
694 [VOL. 68: 689
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Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc.4 1 In this case, the FTC sued
Actavis and alleged that the reverse payment settlements at issue were unfair
42restraints on trade and, therefore, violated federal antitrust laws. While the
Supreme Court refused to hold that these settlements were illegal per se, it
importantly held that such settlements can sometimes violate antitrust laws.43
As such, Actavis has opened the door for the FTC, consumer groups, drug
retailers, insurance companies, and the states to challenge these reverse
settlements under state and federal antitrust laws.
The topic of state action in attacking the validity of pay-for-delay
agreements has been under-explored, with the majority of research and
attention focusing on recent lawsuits filed by the FTC against infringing
companies and, more generally, the repercussions of the Actavis decision for
antitrust law at the federal level. Attacking these agreements at the state
level provides several notable advantages over action at the federal level,
and as a result, state claims particularly of the antitrust variety are
becoming increasingly common.44 One such advantage is that a state-court
fact-finder, weighing evidence presented by local officials or consumers of
economic harm caused by giant, national pharmaceutical companies, may
more favorably view a legal challenge to pay-for-delay agreements.45
Another advantage of state action derives from the fact that these
pharmaceutical companies, many of whom are already facing exorbitant
litigation costs at the federal level as a result of FTC action, would be wary
46of also having to fend off a massive influx of state claims. A last tangible
advantage of state action, though this list is certainly not exhaustive, is the
41. 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
42. Id. at 2229-30.
43. Id. at 2232.
44. Richard A. Samp, The Role of State Antitrust Law in the Aftermath of Actavis, 15
MINN. J.L. SC. & TECH. 149, 150-51 (2014).
45. Id. at 151. For example, consumers in California recently formed a class and sued a
brand-name pharmaceutical company and the associated generic companies for violating
California's antitrust law for engaging in a pay-for-delay agreement. See In re Cipro Cases I &
II, 61 Cal. 4th 116, 348 P.3d 845 (2015), reh'g denied (July 8, 2015). This case will be
discussed extensively below. Here, it is sufficient to note the brand-name drug company at
issue, Bayer AG, settled with the class in 2013 for $74 million, in part because of Bayer's
concern that the state-court fact-finder would rule in favor of consumers and levy an even
greater judgment. See Milano, supra note 33; see also CIPRO SETTLEMENTS,
http://www.ciprosettlement.com (last visited Nov. 5, 2009). The generic companies involved
in the agreement that did not settle in 2013, including Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc., settled
with the class in August 2016 for $100 million for much the same reason. Milano, supra note
33.
46. See Samp, supra note 44, at 166 (stating that plaintiffs "will turn with increasing
frequency to state antitrust law as an alternative remedy.").
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fact that state courts handle claims of unfair trade practices much more
quickly than the federal courts, where such claims particularly antitrust
47claims-tend to move at a glacial pace. Thus, local officials and consumers
are able to redress the devastating economic effects of these agreements with
more efficiency at the state level.48
South Carolina has never addressed the validity of "pay-for-delay"
agreements, and there have been no such cases brought under South
Carolina law. One reason for this is that Actavis and its landmark holding
that pay-for-delay agreements were vulnerable to antitrust scrutiny came
down just under three and a half years ago.4 9 In fact, there have been only
two cases in the entire United States that have been resolved using the "rule
of reason" test since the Actavis decision was announced by the United
States Supreme Court.5o At the state court level, including cases filed pre-
Actavis, there have been only three cases filed concerning pay-for-delay
agreements.5 ' This is all to say that South Carolina is certainly not an outlier
in its lack of case law regarding these agreements. It is important to note that
in 2011 South Carolina's Attorney General signed on to an amicus brief
52advocating for a prohibition of the agreements. The brief was filed in
support of a private antitrust lawsuit in California that had been initiated by a
class of consumers alleging that Bayer and generic competitors had violated
California's antitrust and consumer protection statutes in connection with the
sale of Cipro (ciprofloxacin) within California by agreeing not to compete
47. See id. ("[P]rivate plaintiffs [can] become dissatisfied with the results of pending
litigation under federal antitrust law . . .
48. See id.
49. The Actavis decision came down on June 17, 2013. F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S.
Ct. 2223 (2013).
50. See Nexium (esomeprazole) Antitrust Litigation American Sales Co., LLC v.
AstraZeneca LP, 842 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2016) (stating "the Supreme Court held that the
potential anticompetitive effects of a reverse payment are subject to the anti-trust 'rule of
reason' test") (quoting Actavis, 133 S.Ct. at 2237)); In re Cipro Cases I & II, 61 Cal. 4th 116
at 146, 348 P.3d at 861 (stating "[u]nder the traditional rule of reason, 'inquiry is limited to
whether the challenged conduct promotes or suppresses competition"') (quoting Fisher v. City
of Berkeley, 37 Cal.3d 644, 672, 209 Cal.Rptr. 682, 693 P.2d 261 (1984), aff'd sub nom.
Fisher v. Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260, 106 S.Ct. 1045, 89 L.Ed.2d 206 (1986)).
51. See Teamsters Local 237 Welfare Fund v. AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP, N04C-
11-191 VLM, 2015 WL 4111826 (Del. Super. Ct. Jul. 8, 2015); In re Cipro Cases I & II, 61
Cal.4th 116, 348 P.3d 845; Meyers v. Bayer AG, Bayer Corp., 303 Wis.2d 295, 735 N.W.2d
448 (2007).
52. See Jessica M. Karmasek, McGraw Among AGs on 'Pay-for-Delay' Amicus Brief
WEST VIRGINIA RECORD (Jan. 19, 2011), http://wvrecord.com/stories/510599868-mcgraw-
among-ags-on-pay-for-delay-amicus-brief (naming South Carolina as one of thirty-two states
to sign onto the brief in support of allowing proper antitrust scrutiny of pay-for-delay
agreements).
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with each other, thus precluding lower-cost generic alternatives of Cipro
from entering the marketplace.53 The Attorney General's amicus brief
indicates that there is some recent evidence that South Carolina has been
interested in attacking the validity of these agreements.
This Note will focus on analyzing the following two issues. First, this
Note critically examines whether reverse payment patent settlements run
afoul of several different provisions of the South Carolina statutory code.54
Second, this Note explores whether some type of state litigation would be
56worth exploring to challenge these agreements. Ultimately, this Note first
concludes that South Carolina courts should consider reverse payment patent
settlements between branded and generic drug companies illegal per se
because they should be found to violate the following four statutory
provisions: (1) §39-3-10 Agreements Adversely Affecting Competition or
558Price; (2) §§ 39-3-110-120 Prohibition on Monopolies; (3) § 39-3-
130-Prohibition on Illegal Restraints of Trade;5 9 and (4) § 39-5-20 Unfair
or Deceptive Acts or Practices.6o Accordingly, the Note ends by concluding
that both private and public litigation should be pursued at the state level
against brand-name drug companies participating in these agreements and
61selling their pharmaceutical drugs within South Carolina.
This Note proceeds as follows: Part II.A details the devastating
economic impact pay-for-delay agreements have on individual consumers in
South Carolina and across the nation. Part II.B briefly discusses the
regulatory framework behind pay-for-delay agreements. Part II.C explores
how federal and state courts have dealt with these agreements in the wake of
Actavis. Part II.D introduces the relevant South Carolina statutory provisions
that this Note argues are directly violated by these agreements. Part III
explores whether the agreements violate the above-mentioned statutory
provisions and analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of initiating
litigation under each of the respective statutes. Finally, Part IV of this Note
makes a final recommendation as to how South Carolina should proceed in
attacking the validity of these agreements and in protecting its consumers
from outrageously high pharmaceutical drug prices.
53. Id. See generally In re Cipro Cases I & II, 61 Cal.4th at 132-33, 348 P.3d at 852-53
(state class-action suit attacking validity of pay-for-delay agreements).
54. See infra Part III.
55. See infra Part IV.
56. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-3-10 (2015). See infra Part I.A.
57. § 39-3-100; § 39-3-120. See infra Part II.B.
58. § 39-3-130. See infra part III.C.
59. § 39-5-20(a). See infra Part 1IID.
60. See infra Part IV.
61. See infra Part IIA.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Magnitude ofEconomic Impact
The economic impact of these pay-for-delay agreements on the
individual consumer is huge and disproportionately affects in a negative
manner the elderly and those who are uninsured or living in poverty. For
example, let's consider a low-income South Carolina consumer on Medicare
who takes four separate medications to treat her diabetes, cholesterol, and
heart issues.62 The following prices come from the Generic Pharmaceutical
Association's state-by-state report on the amount of generic drug savings
63within each state for the year 2015. With full access to generic alternatives,
this South Carolina consumer would pay roughly $13.62 per month in total
for all four generic drugs.64 However, without generic access-i.e. under the
market conditions of a pay-for-delay agreement $13.62 would not be
enough to cover a single drug. The South Carolina consumer would instead
be faced with a monthly out-of-pocket cost of $210.96, a 1400% increase.
In addition to these obvious costs to the individual South Carolina consumer,
the agreements also impose costs on the South Carolina state government in
67the form of higher Medicare and Medicaid payments.
Pay-for-delay agreements delay entry of generic competition for an
average of 17 months.6 During this average time period, these "pay-for-
62. See GENERIC PHARM. Ass'N, supra note 37, at 11. This example is modeled off of
facts provided in this 2016 report.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 11. Specifically, the consumer would pay the following prices for the
following generic versions of the respective brand-name drugs: (1) for diabetes-Metformin-
$2.31; (2) for heart failure-Carvedilol-$2.68; (3) for cholesterol Atorvastatin-$4.88; and
(4) for anticoagulant Warfarin-$3.75. Id.
6 5. Id.
66. Id. Specifically, the consumer would pay the following prices for the following
brand-name versions of the respective generic drugs: (1) for diabetes-Glucophage-$43.18;
(2) for heart failure-Coreg-$57.10; (3) for cholesterol-Crestor-$45.39; and (4) for
anticoagulant Xarelto-$65.29. Id.
67. See id. at 17 (noting $1.9 billion in savings to commercial insured health plans, $1.2
billion in savings to Medicare, and $356 billion in savings to Medicaid, respectively); see also
Report: Generic Prescription Drugs Saved South Carolina $3.7 Billion in 2015, PALMETTO
BUSINESS DAILY (Oct. 21, 2016), http://palmettobusinessdaily.com/stories/511028294-report-
generic-prescription-drugs-saved-south-carolina-3-7-billion-in-2015 (noting that improving
optimization of generic drugs by state Medicaid programs could potentially save Medicaid
$2.6 billion).
68. PAY-FOR-DELAY, supra note 31, at 1-2 (calculating the 17-month delay by
comparing the sales-weighted average time between the agreement's execution date and the
date of generic entry into the market).
698 [VOL. 68: 689
10
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 4 [], Art. 8
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol68/iss4/8
HEALTH LAW
delay" agreements are estimated to protect over $20 billion in sales from
generic competition.69 These large sales figures result from brand-name drug
companies taking advantage of this monopoly by keeping the price of their
drugs artificially high or, in some cases, even inflating the drug price, all to
the detriment of the average consumer. For purposes of this Note, the
artificially set brand-name prices are considered "high" because generic drug
prices are, on average, 20%-70% lower than that of the market price
charged by the brand-name drug company.70 Unfortunately, many of the
profit-driven, brand-name pharmaceutical drugs whose prices have been
artificially set at high levels by pay-for-delay agreements are used to treat
life-altering diseases.7 ' For instance, the brand drug Nolvadex (tamoxifen
citrate), a powerful drug used to treat breast cancer, monopolized that
segment of the market at an inflated price of $99.33 due to a pay-for-delay
72agreement that precluded entry of generic competition for nine years.
When a generic was finally able to enter the market, the price of Nolvadex
plummeted to $20.73
Shifting perspectives briefly from the private to public sector, one last
important note on the economic impact of these agreements deals with
reducing the debt load of the federal government. The Congressional Budget
Office ("CBO") has estimated that eliminating pay-for-delay agreements
would help to alleviate the financial burden on federal health care programs
by reducing spending on such programs by $4 billion over a ten-year
period.74 The CBO further estimated that eliminating these agreements
would increase federal revenues by $800 million and reduce spending
69. Id. at 2.
70. GENERIC DRUGS, supra note 36.
71. See COMMUNITY CATALYST & U.S. PIRG, TOP TWENTY PAY-FOR DELAY DRUGS:
How DRUG INDUSTRY PAYOFFS DELAY GENERICS, INFLATE PRICES AND HURT CONSUMERS
(July 11, 2013), http://www.communitycatalyst.org/doc-store/publications/top-20-pay-for-
delay-drugs.pdf Examples include: Adderall XR (amphetamine, dextroamphetamine) (used to
treat Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD)); Aggrenox (aspirin-dipyridamole)
(used to reduce the risk of stroke and to treat blood clots); and Altace (ramipril) (used to treat
high blood pressure and heart failure). Id.
72. Id
73. Id
74. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE, S. 27: PRESERVE ACCESS TO
AFFORDABLE GENERICS ACT 6 (calculated by examining the expected rate of savings
generated nationally to each program); Kyle Deighan, Pay-for-Delay Update: The
Congressional Budget Office Issues New Report Estimating Near $5 Billion Savings by
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subject to appropriation by $400 million between the ten-year period of
2012-2021 .
B. Regulatory Framework
The regulatory framework behind these "pay-for-delay" agreements is
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984
("Hatch-Waxman Act").7 6 With the Hatch-Waxman Act, Congress wished to
speed up the entry of generic competitors into the marketplace in order to
drive down the high costs of brand-name drugs. To incentivize generic
drug companies to challenge brand-name patents that are weak or invalid,
generic companies are allowed to file an ANDA 79 to be submitted for
75. Deighan, supra note 74.
76. Drug Price Competition and Patent Tern Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(b), (); 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271,
282).
77. See 149 CONG. REC. S16104 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 2003) (statement by Sen. Hatch).
According to Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah, co-author of the legislation, one of the main goals
of the Hatch-Waxman Act was to allow generic competitors to challenge the brand-name
patent during the life of the patent, as opposed to having to wait (potentially up to twenty
years) to challenge its validity. See id. See also Ashlee B. Mehl, The Hatch-Waxman Act and
Market Exclusivity for Generic Manufacturers: An Entitlement or an Incentive?, 81 CHI.-
KENT. L. REV. 649, 670 (2006). Thus, the Paragraph IV certification, which is included in the
ANDA and discussed in greater detail below, was included in the Act and allows generic
companies to immediately challenge the brand-name patent based on its weakness or complete
invalidity. See HUTT, supra note 26, at 1016.
78. DENNIS S. FERNANDEZ ET AL., The Interface of Patents with the Regulatory Drug
Approval Process and How Resulting Interplay Can Affect Market Entry, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY MANAGEMENT IN HEALTH AND AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION: A HANDBOOK OF
BEST PRACTICES 965, 969 (A. Krattiger et al. eds., 2007). In order to reach the market, brand-
name drug manufacturers must submit an Investigational New Drug Application to the FDA to
begin testing the quality and safety of the drug. Id. at 966. If the drug passes all phases of
testing, the manufacturer then submits a New Drug Application for FDA approval. Id. To get
from initial testing to final NDA approval, the process typically costs over $500 million dollars
and ten to twelve years of research. Id. To protect this investment, these drug manufacturers
also apply to the U.S. Patent and Trademark office to receive approval of the company's
"invention" (i.e. its new brand-name drug). Id. at 965-66. Importantly, a twenty-year patent is
provided to the manufacturer upon approval from the PTO. Id. at 966. This patent, combined
with FDA approval of its NDA, allows the brand-name manufacturer the right to exclude
others from making or selling the drug in the United States or in U.S. territories or possessions.
Id.
79. See Abbreviated New Drug Application: Generics, FDA.GOV (Aug. 4, 2016),
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApprov
ed/ApprovalApplications/AbbreviatedNewDrugApplicationANDAGenerics; Drugs@FDA
Glossary of Terms, FDA.GOV (Feb. 2, 2012), http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/InfornationOnDrugs/
ucm079436.htm. ANDA's are considered "abbreviated" because, in sharp contrast to an NDA,
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approval by the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"). Within the ANDA,
the generic drug company must make what is known as a "Paragraph IV"
certification0 wherein it proclaims that the brand-name patent at issue is
either invalid or is not being infringed by the generic product. A further
reward provided by Congress for speedy generic challenges is that the first
generic manufacturer to file a "Paragraph IV ANDA" and subsequently gain
approval from the FDA-often deemed the "first-filing generic"-is entitled
to a lucrative 180-day period of market exclusivity, wherein only the brand-
name drug and first filing generic are allowed to be on the market.8 ' No
they generally do not require the generic drug company to perform the same rigorous safety
and efficacy studies demanded of a brand drug (technically referred to as the "innovator
drug"). See Drugs@FDA Glossary of Terms, supra note 79. Thus, in order to submit an
ANDA and bypass these studies, the generic drug company must demonstrate
"bioequivalence." Id. This is done by comparing the generic drug at issue to a "reference listed
drug." Id A reference listed drug is defined as an FDA-approved drug to which generic drugs
are compared in order to show that a particular generic drug is bioequivalent to the FDA-
approved drug. Id. All reference listed drugs, both brand and generic, are published in the
FDA's Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations (colloquially
referred to as "the Orange Book"). See Abbreviated New Drug Application: Generics, supra
note 79. As long as it demonstrates bioequivalence, a generic company may use the extensive
safety and efficacy studies conducted by the pioneer company in submitting its own FDA
application for a generic version of that drug. Id.
80. Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., "Pay for Delay" Settlements of Disputes over
Pharmaceutical Patents, 365 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1439, 1439 (2011). The generic company must
either certify that it will not market its drug before the expiration of the brand-name patent (not
at issue here) or certify that the patent is invalid or not being infringed on by the generic
product (Paragraph IV Certification / Challenge). Id. With Paragraph IV challenges, the
"Orange Book" is relevant once again because it lists all relevant patents associated with the
brand-name drug that the generic company can challenge. Id. A Paragraph IV certification is
considered by the Hatch-Waxman Act to be an act of patent infringement itself, so this
certification almost always instigates litigation on behalf of the brand-name patent holder. See
Matthew Avery, Continuing Abuse of the Hatch-Waxman Act by Pharmaceutical Patent
Holders and the Failure of the 2003 Amendments, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 171, 177 (2008) (citing
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A)).
81. Kesslheim, supra note 80, at 1440. The duopoly created by the 180-day market
exclusivity period can be enormously profitable to the first-filing generic because the generic
company is able to charge artificially high prices that will most certainly plummet upon entry
of multiple other generic competitors (i.e. at the end of the market exclusivity period). Id. For
example, the first-filing generic version of Prozac (fluoxetine), when operating amidst its
duopoly with the brand-name drug, cost $1.91/capsule. Benjamin G. Druss et al., Listening to
Generic Prozac: Winners, Losers, and Sideliners, 23 HEALTH AFFAIRS (Project HOPE,
Bethesda, MD) 210, 213 (2004). Thus, the first-filing generic price was only 12% below the
cost of the actual brand-name Prozac. Id. However, after the exclusivity period had expired
and the duopoly destroyed by the entrance of multiple generic alternatives, the first-filing
generic could charge only $0.32/capsule. Id.
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other generic version of the brand-name drug may enter the market until 180
12
days after the first-filing generic begins marketing its drug.
In response to the Paragraph IV certification, and to block the potential
for immediate approval83 by the FDA, the brand-name company almost
always files a patent infringement suit against the generic company.84 Such a
suit has the effect of blocking FDA approval on the ANDA for a period of
thirty months. Without approval of its ANDA, which is withheld until a
court issues a final order declaring the brand-name patent invalid, non-
enforceable, or not infringed on by the generic company, 1 the generic
company is unable to market its drug. Importantly, as noted above, the
generic companies and their Paragraph IV challenges win in almost 73% of
these types of patent infringement suits. 7 The FDA has full power to
approve the ANDA upon positive resolution of the litigation. Thus, with
the brand-name company now entangled in difficult patent litigation and
very eager to continue monopolizing the market, and with the generic
company armed with leverage in the form of past success of Paragraph IV
challenges, the seeds of pay-for-delay agreements are planted during this 30-
month stay in FDA action on the generic company's ANDA.
82. See Avery, supra note 80, at 181. Another way of saying this is that the FDA is
barred from approving ANDAs filed by other generic companies until the first-filing generic
has used up his 180-day market exclusivity period. Id. Thus, when the pay-for-delay
agreement is entered into, it creates a "bottleneck effect" wherein numerous generic companies
want to enter the market but cannot gain FDA approval. Id.
83. Id. at 177. After receiving notice from the generic drug company of its Paragraph IV
ANDA challenge, the brand-name patent holder has forty-five days to file a patent
infringement suit. Id. If the brand company fails to do so, the FDA has authority to approve the
ANDA immediately. Id.
84. Id. at 177-78.
85. Id. According to Congress, the purpose of this thirty-month stay is to protect NDA
holders who have valid drug patents. Id. at 177-78 (citing H.R. REP. No. 98-957, pt. I, at 28
(1984)). Thus, during this thirty-month stay, the brand company can sue the generic company
for patent infringement. Id. at 177. Congress thought this an appropriate balance-the generic
company can challenge a weak patent via a Paragraph IV challenge before the life of the patent
is up, and the brand company has a thirty-month window during which it can sue the generic
company and defend the merits of its patent without having to worry about the generic's entry
into the market. H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt., 1 at 28.
86. Avery, supra note 80, at 177. The FDA may only "tentatively approve" the ANDA,
meaning that it will become effective immediately upon the end of the stay of thirty-months or
upon a favorable court order to the generic company in the patent litigation at issue-
whichever comes sooner. Id.
87. PAY-FOR-DELAY, supra note 31 (noting that the FTC issued a study that found that
generics prevailed in 73% of the patent litigation that ended with a decision by the court).
88. See Avery, supra note 80, at 177 (noting that the FDA's tentative approval of the
ANDA can become effective upon a district court finding of patent invalidity or
noninfringement during the stay).
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Due to the significant loss of market share and profits that pioneer
brand-name drugs experience upon entry of generic competitors,89 the
brand-name drug company will enter into a "financial arrangement" (i.e.
reverse settlement agreement) wherein the brand-name company will pay the
generic company a fee to delay the marketing of its generic version of the
brand-name company's drug for a specified period of time.90 The amount of
money the brand-name company is able to pay the generic company is
enough to convince the generic company to temporarily forgo reaping
profits from the mass-market of consumers eager for a cheaper altemative.9'
Put differently, the amount of the reverse payment exceeds the amount in
profits the first-filing generic expects to receive during the 180-day period of
market exclusivity. Thus, the brand-name company enjoys the fruits of its
monopoly, the first-filing generic enjoys its massive reverse payment and the
knowledge that it will eventually take advantage of its lucrative 180-day
market exclusivity period, and consumers often are left unable to afford the
artificially high prices that effect, in some instances, life-altering
medications produced by these brand-name companies.
C. Actavis and its Subsequent Interpretation by Federal and State
Courts
Although the federal courts have seized upon the opportunity provided
by Actavis to challenge the validity of pay-for-delay agreements, state courts
89. Remember the example of Ms. Winkler, who went from paying $700/month for
Provigil (modafinil), to $32/month. See Thompson, supra note 1. Another example is Lipitor
(atorvastatin), which cost consumers $205 for a thirty-day supply. Big Pharma's Pay-for-
Delay Deals Take a Hit, UNITED STATES PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP (June 17,
2013), http://www.uspirg.org/news/usp/big-pharmas-pay-delay-deals-take-hit. Now that the
generic version is available, it costs $16 for a thirty-day supply. Id. Another example is
Lamictal (lamotrigine), which cost consumers $465 as a brand-name drug thirty-three times
the price of the generic version with full competition ($14). COMMUNITY CATALYST & U.S.
PIRG, supra note 71.
90. HUTT, supra note 26, at 1016.
91. See In re Cipro Cases I & II, 61 Cal. 4th 116, 132-33, 348 P.3d 845, 852 (2015),
reh'g denied (July 8, 2015). For example, Bayer AG paid generic drug manufacturer Barr
Pharmaceuticals and three other generic companies $398 million to delay entry of its lower-
cost generic drug. Id Cephalon entered into an agreement with four generic drug companies to
protect its brand-name drug Provigil (modafinil) and paid them a total of $300 million to keep
their generic drugs off of the market. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, supra note 8. As
a last example, the brand-name manufacturer of Zantac paid $133 million to a generic
competitor to resolve the patent litigation at issue. C. Scott Hemphill, Drug Patent Settlements
Between Rivals: A Survey 3 (unpublished note) (on file with Columbia Law School).
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92have been slower to do so, with California being the major exception. As
noted above, while the Supreme Court in Actavis refused to hold that these
92. In terms of state action, the most notable case has been in California, discussed
extensively below, wherein a class of consumers, suing under California's antitrust law, earned
settlements from four out of the five companies at issue in the pay-for-delay agreement. In re
Cipro Cases I & II, 61 Cal. 4th 116, 348 P.3d 845, (2015), reh'g denied (July 8, 2015); see
also Milano, supra note 33.
The total amount awarded to the class affected by this unfair trade practice equaled nearly
$175 million. Milano, supra note 33. Although state court litigation has been slow, state
Attorney Generals across the country have seized upon Actavis and sued various brand-name
companies, such as Cephalon in connection with the pay-for-delay agreement that has been
already been discussed in this Note. See Press Release, New York Attorney General, A.G.
Schneiderman Announces $125 Million Settlement With Drug Company That Impeded
Competition By Generic Prescription Makers (Aug. 4, 2016), https://ag.ny.gov/press-
release/ag-schneiderman-annonces-125-million-settlement-drug-company-impeded-
competition. In 2016, Cephalon settled with the Attorney Generals for $125 million dollars,
with $35 million going to consumers across the country, and $90 million going to state
governments across the country. Id. See also P.J. D'Annunzio, Cephalon, State AGs Settle
Provigil Pay-for-Delay' Antitrust Case for $125M, NAT. L.J. (Aug. 4, 2016),
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202764385964/Cephalon-State-AGs-Settle-Provigil-
PayforDelay-Antitrust-Case-for-125M?slretum=20161118161508. On the federal side, the
FTC has been incredibly active in attacking pay-for-delay agreements. For example, on March
31, 2016, the FTC filed a complaint against Endo Pharmaceuticals, Inc., its partners, and
several generic companies for entering into agreements delaying entry of lower-cost generic
alternatives to Endo's brand-name drugs. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Sues Endo
Pharmaceuticals Inc. and Others for Illegally Blocking Lower-Cost Generic Versions of the
Branded Drugs Opana ER and Lidoderm (Mar. 31, 2016). Specifically, the FTC alleges that in
May of 2012, Endo and its partners, Teikoku Seiyaku Co. Ltd. and Teikoku Pharma USA, Inc.,
entered into an agreement with Watson Laboratories, Inc. stating that "until September 2013,
Watson would not compete with Endo and Teikoku by marketing a generic version of Endo's
Lidoderm patch. In exchange, Endo paid Watson hundreds of millions of dollars ... [and]
Endo illegally maintained its monopoly over Lidoderm." Id. In a non FTC-related case,
decided in early 2016, the First Circuit affirmed a jury verdict from 2013 that found an
antitrust violation had occurred when the brand-name company at issue, AstraZeneca, made a
"large and unjustified" reverse payment to the generic company at issue, Ranbaxy, to protect
its brand-name drug (Nexium (esomeprazole)) from competition in the marketplace. Nexium
(esomeprazole) Antitrust Litigation American Sales Co., LLC v. AstraZeneca LP, 842 F.3d 34
(1st Cir. 2016). As of January 2017, the following cases concerning pay-for-delay agreements
were pending in the following federal circuits: (1) 1st Circuit: In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust
Litig., 814 F.3d 538 (1st Cir. 2016); In re Solodyn (Minocycline Hydrochloride) Antitrust
Litig., No. 14-md-02503-DJC, 2016 WL 6897809 (D. Mass. Sept. 16, 2015); United Food and
Commercial Workers Unions and Emp'rs' Midwest Health Benefits Fund et al. v. Novartis
Pharm. Corp. et al., No. 1:15-cv-12732 (D. Mass 2015); In re Asacol Antitrust Litig., No. 15-
cv-12730-DJC, 2017 WL 588288 (D. Mass. Feb. 10, 2017); Rochester Drug Co-Operative Inc.
v. Shire LLC et al., No. 1:2017cv10050 (D. Mass Jan. 11, 2017); (2) 2nd Circuit: In re
Aggrenox Antitrust Litig., No. 3:14-md-2516 (SRU), 2016 WL4204478 (D. Conn. Aug. 9,
2016); In re Actos End-Payor Antitrust Litig., 848 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2017); (3) Third Circuit:
King Drug Co. of Florence Inc. v. Cephalon Inc. et al., No. 2:06-cv-2768, 2016 WL 297486
(E.D. Pa. 2016); In re K-Dur Antitrust et al., No. 01:-cv-1652 (SRC)(CLW), 2016 WL 755623
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settlements were illegal per se, it held that such settlements can sometimes
violate the antitrust laws.93 Importantly, the Court agreed with the FTC's
argument that the reverse payment settlements at issue could potentially be
viewed as unfair restraints on trade.94 Thus, although the holding in Actavis
is seemingly narrowed to federal antitrust law, the implications of the
holding reach much farther.95 Put differently, the holding in Actavis has
paved the way for states such as South Carolina to challenge the agreements
as unfair restraints of trade under a variety of state statutes, including those
96dealing with antitrust issues or illegal restraints of trade.
1. Interpretation by State Courts
One such state to follow the lead of Actavis is California, where
consumers formed a class and sued Bayer under California's antitrust
97statute. Cipro is the most significant state court case to deal with reverse
payment settlements since the Actavis decision in 2013. In Cipro, the brand-
name drug company Bayer paid $398 million to four different generic drug
companies to settle the patent litigation at issue and to delay the marketing
and sale of a generic version of Cipro (ciprofloxacin).98 During the time in
which the generic drug was delayed entry into the marketplace, Bayer made
(D.N.J. Feb. 25, 2016); In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., No. 3:12-cv-02389 (PGS), 2015 WL
1285331 (D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2015); In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litig., No. 11-5479 (PGS)(LHG),
2014 WL 4988410 (D.N.J. Oct. 6, 2014); F.T.C. v. AbbVie Inc., 107 F. Supp. 3d 428 (E.D. Pa.
May 6, 2015); In re Niaspan Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d 735 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 5, 2014); (4)
7th Circuit: In re Opana ER Antitrust Litig., 162 F. Supp. 3d 704 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 10, 2016); (5)
8th Circuit: United Healthcare Sers. Inc. v. Cephalon Inc. et al., No. 0:16-cv-02563 (D. Minn.
July 28, 2016); (6) 9th Circuit: In re Lidoderm Antitrust Litig., No. 14-md-02521-WHO, 2017
WL 679367 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2017); (7) 11th Circuit: In re Androgel Antitrust Litig. (No.
II), No. 1:09-CV-955-TWT, 2014 WL 1600331 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 21, 2014).
93. F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2232 (2013).
Although this Note later takes issue with the ultimate holding of Actavis arguing that it
should have adopted the FTC's position and either held that the agreements were illegal per se
or, at the very least, incorporated the "quick-look test" analysis in the "rule of reason" test
when evaluating the validity of the agreements-its importance in undermining the perceived
legality of pay-for-delay agreements cannot be understated.
94. Id. at 2226.
95. See Samp, supra note 44, at 150-51 (discussing how pay-for-delay defendants have
a difficult time convincing courts that federal law should pre-empt state claims, at least as it
regards to state claims that do not exceed the scope of the Sherman Act).
96. Id. at 166 (discussing the wide-variety of available state law claims as one of the
benefits of state litigation in attacking pay-for-delay agreements).
97. In re Cipro Cases I & II, 61 Cal. at 133, 348 P.3d at 852.
98. Id. at 132-33, 348 P.3d at 852.
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over $1 billion off its sales of Cipro.99 The plaintiffs-a collection of non-
profits and individuals from California-sued Bayer and claimed that the
pay-for-delay agreements violated California's antitrust laws by stifling
competition and driving up the price of Cipro.'00 Relying on Actavis to
remand the case for further consideration, the court reversed the lower
court's ruling that the agreements at issue were legal and noted that the
agreements were "not immune from antitrust scrutiny."'0' This case lay
dormant in the California Court of Appeals for several years before the
United States Supreme Court handed down Actavis-further underscoring
the importance and influence Actavis has had in spurring states to take action
against pay-for-delay settlements.102
Cipro also proves just how successful state action can be in attacking
pay-for-delay agreements. In 2013, Bayer settled with the California class
for $74 million.103 This past August, three generic companies involved in the
pay-for-delay agreement settled with the California class for $100 million.1 04
Only one generic company, Barr Pharmaceuticals, Inc., has refused to settle
in lieu of fighting the class at trial.105 These settlements are a prime example
of how effective state action can be in redressing the economic harm caused
to individual consumers through higher prices driven by pay-for-delay
agreements. Although Cipro deals exclusively with state antitrust issues, and
therefore does not cover the full spectrum of issues raised in this Note, it is
most important for its status as a model for state action that South Carolina
could follow, under both its antitrust statutes and others that have been
mentioned above and will be analyzed in much greater detail below.
2. Interpretation by Federal Courts
In terms of federal court involvement, the FTC has taken full advantage
of Actavis and is continuously suinglo0 large pharmaceutical companies for
their engagement in pay-for-delay agreements.0 7 For example, the FTC
99. Id. at 133, 348 P.3d at 852.
100. Id. at 133, 348 P.3d at 852-53.
101. Id. at 130, 348 P.3d at 850-51.
102. Id. at 133, 348 P.3d at 852-53.
103. Milano, supra note 33.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See cases cited supra note 92.
107. Given its resource base and overall interest in preventing anticompetitive activities,
it is no surprise to see the FTC take the lead in such a manner. It is important to note, however,
that the FTC has certainly not been alone in bringing action in federal courts attacking the
validity of pay-for-delay agreements. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (listing several
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reached a settlement with Cephalon, Inc. for a total of $1.2 billion in
connection with the pay-for-delay agreement it entered into regarding
Provigil (modafinil).'0 s The settlement was in response to the Commission's
antitrust suit wherein it accused Cephalon of engaging in a reverse payment
settlement to block generic competition.'09 The massive settlement is
indicative of Cephalon's wariness of the federal courts' stance on pay-for-
delay agreements in the wake of Actavis."10 The settlement amount of $1.2
billion is also an excellent indication of the large amounts of money
consumers lose as a result of this business practice.
3. South Carolina Statutory Provisions
Pay-for-delay agreements should be found to violate the following four
South Carolina statutory provisions: (1) § 39-3-10 Agreements Adversely
Affecting Competition or Price;"' (2) §§ 39-3-110, 39-3-120 Prohibition
on Monopolies;112 (3) § 39-3-130-Prohibition on Illegal Restraints of
Trade;113 and (4) §39-5-20 Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices.114
First, reverse payment settlements should be found to violate South
Carolina's antitrust statute because they lessen the full and free competition
in the sale of pharmaceutical drugs in South Carolina and therefore serve to
control the price structure of the drug market to the detriment of South
Carolina consumers. Per § 39-3-10, South Carolina prohibits and declares
void and unlawful as against public policy the following agreements:
1. [agreements that] tend to lessen, full and free competition
in the importation or sale of articles imported into this state
or in the manufacture or sale of articles;
2. [agreements that] advance, reduce, or control the price of
the cost ... of any such product or article; and
pay-for-delay cases recently decided or currently before the federal circuits that were brought
by either individual consumers or consumer interest groups).
108. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, supra note 8.
109. Id
110. See id.
111. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-3-10 (2015).
112. Id § 39-3-110; 39-3-120.
113. Id § 39-3-130.
114. Id. § 39-5-20(a).
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3. [agreements that] lessen or affect in any manner the full
and free competition ... or prices in any branch of
trade . . . or commerce.1
Second, these agreements should be found to violate South Carolina's
prohibition against monopolies because they create a market structure
wherein the brand-name company dominates the marketplace as its sole
seller and, due to the agreement, faces no generic competition. A monopoly
is statutorily defined as a market structure wherein there is only a single
seller that faces little to no competition. Such unions or agreements are
illegal under South Carolina law. 117
Third, these agreements should be found to violate South Carolina's
prohibition against illegal restraints on trade because they fix the price of the
brand-name drug by protecting it from generic competition and thus prevent
the price from dropping to its market equilibrium. In South Carolina, any
corporation "transacting or conducting any kind of business in this
State . . . who shall create [or] enter into . . . any pool, trust, agreement,
combination ... with any other corporation ... to regulate or fix the price of
any article of manufacture" shall be guilty of imposing an illegal restraint on
trade."
Fourth, these settlements should be found to violate South Carolina's
prohibition against unfair trade practices because the practice of stifling
generic competition and artificially controlling the price of a brand-name
drug is patently unfair. South Carolina prohibits unfair methods of
competition and unfair or deceptive practices when conducting trade or
commerce within the state.119 For the purposes of interpreting this
prohibition, the terms "trade" and "commerce" are defined as "the
advertising, offering for sale, sale, or distributing of ... any commodity or
thing of value wherever situate, and shall include any trade or commerce
directly or indirectly affecting the people of this state."20
III. ANALYSIS
South Carolina courts should consider reverse payment patent
settlements between branded and generic drug companies illegal per se
115. Id. § 39-3-10.
116. Id. § 39-3-110.
117. Id. § 39-3-120.
118. Id. § 39-3-130.
119. Id. § 39-5-20(a).
120. Id. § 39-5-10(b).
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because they should be found to violate several different provisions of the
South Carolina statutory code. Accordingly, both private and public
litigation should be pursued against brand-name drug companies
participating in these agreements and selling their drugs within the state.
A. Analysis under § 39-3-10 (State Antitrust Statute)
Pay-for-delay agreements should be found to violate South Carolina's
antitrust statute because they lessen the full and free competition of the sale
of pharmaceutical drugs in South Carolina and therefore serve to control the
price structure of the drug market to the detriment of South Carolina
consumers. More specifically, these agreements produce the following three
negative external effects on trade that South Carolina's antitrust statute is
intended to protect: (1) they lessen the full and free competition in the sale
of pharmaceutical drugs in South Carolina; (2) they function to artificially
control the price of pharmaceutical drugs to the detriment of the consumer;
and (3) they lessen the full and free competition in the price structure of the
pharmaceutical drug market.
1. Substantive Analysis Under § 39-3-10
The state case law under South Carolina's antitrust statute is sparse and
deals primarily with procedural issues relating to causes of action arising
from a violation of the statute.121 Thus, the substantive analysis under § 39-
3-10 is driven almost entirely by the plain language of South Carolina's
antitrust statute in addition to consideration of the United States Supreme
Court's reasoning in the Actavis decision that led to its landmark holding
that pay-for-delay agreements can sometimes be unfair restraints of trade
and violate antitrust laws.122 In particular, this Note is concerned with the
United States Supreme Court's resolution of a federal circuit split as to the
proper antitrust standard to apply when evaluating a reverse payment patent
121. Specifically, there have only been three South Carolina cases decided under this
statute since 1950. See generally Dickerson v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Affiliated Ltd., 312
S.C. 264, 440 S.E.2d 359 (1994) (turning on unrelated issues dealing with prosecutorial
immunity); General Supplies, Inc. v. Southwire Co., 276 S.C. 55, 275 S.E.2d 579 (1981)
(concluding that class action suits are barred under the state antitrust statute); State ex rel.
Callison v. National Linen Service Corp., 225 S.C. 232, 81 S.E.2d 342 (1954) (answering an
unrelated question as to whether employees of a corporation can form the second half of a
"combination" or "agreement" such that the combination or agreement is subjected to the state
antitrust statute).
122. F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2232 (2013).
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settlement.123 The Second and Eleventh Circuits had been analyzing the
validity of pay-for-delay agreements under the "scope-of-the-patent test"
wherein the agreement is considered lawful as long as the generic company
is not precluded from entering the market once the brand-name's exclusivity
patent has expired.124 By stark contrast, the Third Circuit had been using the
"quick-look test" wherein the agreement was considered presumptively
unlawful unless the brand company could show that the reverse payment had
a valid business purpose other than to exclude generic competitors or was
otherwise pro-competitive. 12 The FTC argued vehemently in favor of courts
adopting the "quick-look" approach and treating pay-for-delay agreements
as presumptively unlawful.126 The Supreme Court discarded both approaches
and instead held in somewhat vague terms that the governing standard is
"the rule of reason," 127 which posits that pay-for-delay agreements are
considered illegal when they have the effect of unreasonably restraining
trade.128 The Court then listed the following factors and considerations for
lower courts to use in deciphering this "rule of reason" standard.
First, the Court in Actavis considered the fact that pay-for-delay
agreements have the potential for genuinely anticompetitive effects-
namely, higher pharmaceutical drug prices for consumers.129 On this point,
the Court elucidated the following factors for lower courts to consider when
examining whether a pay-for-delay agreement is anticompetitive: (1) the size
of the settlement;130 (2) the scale of the settlement amount in relation to the
expected litigation costs from the patent dispute;131 and (3) the lack of any
convincing justification for the settlement other than to secure market
123. See Leon B. Greenfield et al., FTC v. Actavis: Supreme Court Adopts Rule of






127. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237.
128. See id. See also F.T.C. v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986)
(applying the rule of reason analysis to the restraint at issue involving a claim under the
Sherman Act); Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. U.S., 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (endorsing the "rule
of reason" test laid out in Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. and noting that the standard of reason had
theretofore been applied in the United States in the context of prohibitions in the Sherman
Act); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (affirming the "rule of
reason" analysis as first articulated by the Sixth Circuit as applicable to U.S. antitrust laws).
129. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234.
130. Id. at 2234-35.
131. Id. at 2235-36.
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power.132 The Court focused in particular on the implications of the size of
settlement, reasoning that these settlements often provide for exorbitant
payments from the brand-name drug company to the generic company that
are far greater than what would be needed to cover the costs of patent
litigation.133 From this, the Court deduced that a large reverse payment is a
likely indicator that the patent owner has sizable market power and is
attempting to prevent market entry because, inter alia, a firm without such
market power would be unable to charge the high drug prices necessary to
cover the settlement costs of preventing generic entry.134
As will be argued in greater detail below, the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Actavis to apply the "rule of reason" test when
evaluating the legality of pay-for-delay agreements, which was supported by
a bare majority,3 5 constitutes a step in the right direction; however, it is far
too vague and deferential to the brand-name drug company. South Carolina
courts, if not willing to consider pay-for-delay agreements per se illegal,
should therefore consider applying a modified version of the "rule of reason"
test that could work in the following manner: in analyzing a pay-for-delay
agreement, if the court is able to find obvious instances of anticompetitive
effects, the quick-look analysis is employed, the agreement is presumptively
invalid, and the burden shifts to the defendant to justify the agreement based
on a reason unrelated to a desire to continue monopolizing the market.136
However, if anticompetitive effects are not readily found, the court does not
132. Id. at 2236.
133. Id. at 2234-35 ("The Court's settlement on the terms said by the FTC to be at issue
here payment in return for staying out of the market-simply keeps prices at patentee-set
levels, potentially producing the full patent-related $500 million monopoly return while
dividing that return between the challenged patentee and the patent challenger. The patentee
and the challenger gain; the consumer loses. Indeed, there are indications that patentees
sometimes pay a generic challenger a sum even larger than what the generic would gain in
profits if it won the paragraph IV litigation and entered the market. The rationale behind a
payment of this size cannot in every case be supported by traditional settlement considerations.
The payment may instead provide strong evidence that the patentee seeks to induce the generic
challenger to abandon its claim with a share of its monopoly profits that would otherwise be
lost in the competitive market.") (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
134. Id. at 2236.
135. See generally id. Actavis is 5-3 decision with Justice Breyer writing the majority
opinion joined by Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Id. The Chief Justice
filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Scalia and Thomas joined. Id. Justice Alito did not
participate. Id.
136. Joel S. Sprout, Presumptively Illegal: The Supreme Court's Missed Opportunity in
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resort to this abbreviated version of the rule of reason test3 7 and will instead
proceed with the full test as articulated in Actavis, with the modification that
the burden of proof would be switched to the defendant to provide evidence
of the agreement's procompetitive effects.
In sum, South Carolina courts should consider the appropriate antitrust
standard to apply when evaluating an antitrust claim under § 39-3-10 to be a
modified rule of reason test, taking into account also the plain language of
the statute itself.
a. Analysis Under Subsection (a)
First, taking the plain language of the statute one subsection at a time,
beginning with subsection (a), supra, it is clear that pay-for-delay
agreements lessen the full and free competition in the sale of pharmaceutical
drugs in South Carolina because they restrict generic competition from
entering into the marketplace. A first-filing Paragraph IV ANDA challenger
has the ability, pending resolution of the relevant patent litigation and final
approval by the FDA, to enter the marketplace as soon as a court issues a
final order declaring the brand-name patent invalid, non-enforceable, or not
infringed on by the generic company.138 Thus, at this stage of the
proceedings, the lower-cost generic drug is generally only months away
from being able to market its drug.139 Furthermore, once the first-filing
generic has used its 180-day market exclusivity period, additional generic
competitors will flood into the market, as the FDA is free to approve
multiple other ANDAs.140
A pay-for-delay agreement, however, immediately precludes such
market competition from occurring by halting the process as soon as a
branded company is faced with a first-filing Paragraph IV ANDA
challenger. Not only does the first-filing generic fail to enter the market, but
no other generic company may enter the market until the first-filing generic
uses its 180-day period of market exclusivity.141 As a result, a "bottleneck"
effect occurs wherein multiple generic companies are eager to provide
consumers with lower-cost alternatives but are restricted from even being
137. I.e. the quick-look test.
138. Here, it is important to remember that the generic challenger wins this patent
litigation at a disproportionate rate, see PAY-FOR-DELAY, supra note 31, at 3, and that the
FDA often immediately approves the ANDA upon positive resolution of the litigation. See
Avery, supra note 80, at 177.
139. See Avery, supra note 80, at 177.
140. Id. at 178.
141. Id.
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considered by the FDA for approval.142 On average, this bottleneck lasts for
seventeen months for any given pay-for-delay agreement.143 For life-altering
drugs which tend to involve highly specialized patents that branded
companies are eager to protect the average length of delay is often far
higher.144
From this analysis, it follows that pay-for-delay agreements lessen the
full and free competition in the sale of pharmaceutical drugs in South
Carolina by restricting generic competition from entering into the
marketplace and therefore should be found by South Carolina courts to
violate subsection (a) of South Carolina's antitrust statute.
b. Analysis Under Subsection (b) and (c)
Second, moving on to subsections (b) and (c), supra, it is clear that pay-
for-delay agreements function to artificially control the price of
pharmaceutical drugs to the detriment of the consumer because they lessen
the full and free competition in the price structure within the pharmaceutical
drug market.
Initially, the brand-name company enjoys a patent-protected right to
control the price of a pharmaceutical drug because it enjoys exclusive
control over that segment of the market. A necessary deduction is that the
brand-name company further enjoys a right to determine the price structure
of the market, being its only actor. The prices brand-name companies are
able charge when enjoying market exclusivity are extraordinary.145
These rights are challenged when a generic company receives FDA
approval on its ANDA and proceeds into the market. Absent a controlling
pay-for-delay agreement, the generic ompany proceeds into the market
place, enjoying its 180-day period of exclusivity in which no other generic
142. Id. at 181.
143. See PAY-FOR-DELAY, supra note 31.
144. See COMMUNITY CATALYST & U.S. PIRG, supra note 71. For example, the generic
form of Sinemet CR (carbidopa-levodopa), a prescription drug used to treat Parkinson's
disease, was delayed for eleven years. Id. The generic form of Adderall XR (amphetamine,
dextroamphetamine), a highly common prescription drug used to treat ADHD, was delayed for
three years. Id. The generic form of Nolvadex (tamoxifen citrate), a prescription drug used to
treat breast cancer, was delayed for nine years. Id.
145. For instance, we saw Ms. Winkler pay $700 for a six-month supply of Provigil, see
Thompson, supra note 1. Cancer patients across the United States were forced to pay $99.33
for the brand-name drug Nolvadex (tamoxifen citrate). See COMMUNITY CATALYST & U.S.
PIRG, supra note 71. The manufacturers of Zocor (simvastatin), a prescription drug used to
lower cholesterol, charged $164 for a one-month supply. See id.
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competitor may enter.146 As noted above, entry of the "first-filing generic"
does not cause a drastic reduction in the cost of a certain drug.147 Generally,
the first-filing generic version costs 20-30% less than the brand-name
drug.148 Thus, the brand-name company's ability to control the price
structure of the pharmaceutical drug market, while weakened, is still largely
intact. However, these statistics foreshadow the massive drop in price that
accompanies the flow of further generic competitors once the 180-day
market exclusivity period has ended. Upon entry of multiple generic
competitors, the price of the generic version can cost up to 85% less than the
brand-name market price.149 On average, the price of a generic drug is 75%
lower than that of the retail price of the brand-name drug.15 0
Of course, if the brand-name company and first-filing generic decide to
instead enter into a pay-for-delay agreement, the brand-name company will
be allowed to artificially set the market price of the drug and will continue to
determine the price structure of the pharmaceutical drug market. Brand-
name drugs are more expensive than generic drugs for two main reasons.
The first and most important reason is also the simplest: the brand company
has patent-protected monopoly power after receiving approval of its NDA
from the FDA and can therefore set the price at whatever level it chooses.i15
Generic drugs, on the other hand, are priced lower because generic
companies must compete with both the brand-name company as well as
other generic competitors within that segment of the market.152 Second,
because the brand-name company needs to recoup the hundreds of millions
of dollars it spends in the research and clinical trials necessary to gain FDA
approval to get its medication to market, it obviously has an incentive to
maximize profits by selling the drug at a high price to consumers. 153 By
146. See HUTT, supra note 26, at 1014.
147. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, POLICY
ROUNDTABLES: GENERIC PHARMACEUTICALS (2009).
148. Id. at 9.
149. Facts About Generic Drugs, FDA (June 28, 2016),
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/BuyingUsingMedicineSafely/Unders
tandingGenericDrugs/ucml67991.htm.
150. Thomas Sullivan, GAO Report Drug Pricing: Research on Savings from Generic
Drug Use, Policy and Medicine, POLICY MED (March 14, 2012), http://www.policy
med.com/2012/03/gao-report-drug-pricing-research-on-savings-from-generic-drug-use.html.
151. See Sydney Lupkin, 5 Reasons Prescription Drug Prices Are So High in the U.S.,
TIME (Aug. 23, 2016), http://time.com/money/4462919/prescription-drug-prices-too-high; see
also CURT D. FURBERG ET AL., KNOWING YOUR MEDICATIONS: A GUIDE TO BECOMING AN
INFORMED PATIENT 54 (2010).
152. See FURBERG, supra note 151, at 55-56.
153. Id. at 54.
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contrast, generic drugs have very low developmental costs and can therefore
be priced much lower than its brand counterpart.154
Pay-for-delay agreements allow the brand-name drug company to
continue to charge a monopolistic price for its drug, and this has crippling
effects on individual consumers already burdened with exploding health care
costs. To most clearly see how pay-for-delay agreements artificially control
the price structure of pharmaceutical drugs in South Carolina, let's consider
the issue from micro-level. For example, let's consider a low-income South
Carolina consumer on a commercial insurance plan who takes four separate
medications to help deal with a myriad of ailments such as bipolar disorder
and chronic pain.5 5 With no generic alternative-i.e. under the price
structure artificially set by pay-for-delay agreements-this consumer will
pay the following prices for a one-month supply of each of her brand-name
drugs: (1) Glucophage: $67.94; (2) Crestor: $88.35; (3) Abilify: $182.89;
and (4) Oxycontin: $231.38.15 This consumer therefore faces a total
monthly out-of-pocket cost of $570.76. 157 Add in multiple generic
competitors, and the price drop is staggering. With the availability of generic
altematives-free from the strictures of a pay-for-delay agreement this
same consumer will now pay the following prices for a one-month supply of
each of her drugs: (1) Metformin: $4.34; (2) Atorvastatin: $12.01; (3)
Aripiprazole: $60.07; and (4) Oxycontin: $21.47. This same consumer
now faces a total monthly out-of-pocket cost of $97.89-a savings of over
488%.159 The plummeting of brand-prices upon generic entry is therefore
further concrete proof of the fact that pay-for-delay agreements allow brand-
name companies to artificially control their prices.
Accordingly, it is clear that pay-for-delay agreements function to
artificially control the price of pharmaceutical drugs to the detriment of the
consumer because they lessen the full and free competition in the price
structure within the pharmaceutical drug market. It is therefore further clear
that these agreements should be found to violate subsections (b) and (c) of
South Carolina's antitrust statute.
154. Id. at 56.
155. GENERIC PHARM. Ass'N, supra note 37, at 12. This example is modeled off of facts
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c. Shortcomings ofActavis' "Rule ofReason"
As noted above, the "rule of reason" test is an incredibly vague test
providing that reverse settlement agreements will be held unlawful when
they are, inter alia, "large and unjustified."16 0 The Court, although
elucidating several considerations and factors to consider when evaluating
the validity of these agreements, largely intended to allow the lower courts
to develop the full parameters of the rule of reason test.161 Aside from this
vague rule and the accompanying factors, the court in Actavis provided no
further structure for courts to follow when reviewing these agreements.162
One negative consequence of this unclear test is that the phrase "large and
unjustified," which is emphasized by the Court in Actavis as one of the
fundamental considerations of an agreement's legality, may be construed as
being too deferential to the brand-name drug company.163 Put differently,
even if a reverse settlement payment is exorbitantly large-far greater than
expected patent litigation costs, for instance-the plaintiff still faces the
burden of proving that the settlement was "unjustified."
Instead, South Carolina courts should consider pay-for-delay
agreements illegal per se because of the potential statutory violations
detailed above. At the very least, South Carolina courts, if not willing to take
a per se approach, should modify the "rule of reason" test by heavily
incorporating elements of the so-called "quick-look" analysis.164 The quick-
look interpretation of the rule of reason, long advocated for by the FTC and
numerous courts pre-Actavis as the next best alternative to the per se
approach, regards pay-for-delay agreements as presumptively invalid as
anticompetitive and places the burden of proving an agreement's legality on
160. F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013).
161. Id. at 2238 ("We therefore leave to the lower courts the structuring of the present
rule of reason antitrust litigation.").
162. See id. at 2237-38. See also Samp, supra note 44, at 159 (noting that the United
States Supreme Court declined to adopt a "bright line" test in favor of a more flexible "rule of
reason" analysis).
163. See Samp, supra note 44, at 162; see also Sprout, supra note 136, at 775 (arguing
that the Court should have placed more pressure on pharmaceutical companies by ruling that
reverse payment settlements are presumptively illegal: "[t]he Court's rationale could have led
to [adopting the quick-look analysis], but it fell short, and instead it imposed a [rule of reason]
test on the lower courts that will almost certainly allow pharmaceutical companies to continue
using reverse payment settlements to keep prescription drug prices higher than necessary").
164. See Samp, supra note 44, at 158-59 n. 43. The FTC's position actually evolved in
much the same fashion. Id. The FTC initially argued for a per se ban of pay-for-delay
agreements as the case was making its way up to the Supreme Court. Id. at 158-59. However,
by the time Actavis was actually under consideration by the Court, the FTC changed its
position to advocating for the "quick-look" analysis. Id. at 158-59, n. 43.
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the brand-name patent holder. 16 Thus, as noted above, the rule of reason test
could work in the following manner: in analyzing a pay-for-delay
agreement, if the court is able to find obvious instances of anticompetitive
effects, the quick-look analysis is employed, the agreement is presumptively
invalid, and the burden shifts to the defendant to justify the agreement based
on a reason unrelated to a desire to continue monopolizing the market.166
However, if anticompetitive effects are not readily found, the court does not
resort to the abbreviated version of the rule of reason test167 and will instead
proceed with the full test as articulated in Actavis, with the modification that
the burden of proof would be switched to the defendant to provide evidence
of the agreement's procompetitive effects.16s
Unsurprisingly, the pharmaceutical companies favor this unmodified,
full version of the rule of reason test because it places an enormous
evidentiary burden on the plaintiffs and is highly deferential to any
reasoning given by the pharmaceutical companies that the payments are
"justified."169 Such burden shifting and deference to the pharmaceutical
companies are exactly why the "quick-look" analysis is the better approach
and should be incorporated into Actavis' articulation of its rule of reason
test. Importantly, this quick-look approach would provide much-needed
clarity to a major foundation of the "rule of reason" test the determination
of whether the payment is "justified" by forcing the patent holder to
explain why the settlement is needed.17 0 Specifically, the burden would be
on the patent holder to explain that the agreement has a valid business
purpose other than to exclude generic competitors or is otherwise
procompetitive. A court would evaluate the validity of the agreement and
determine whether the reverse payment is "justified" using factors elucidated
by the Supreme Court in Actavis to determine whether the pay-for-delay
agreement is anticompetitive.17 1 This formulation of the rule of reason test
alleviates the uninformed plaintiff's oftentimes insurmountable evidentiary
task of proving why the agreement, of which his knowledge pales in
165. See Sprout, supra note 136, at 775.
166. Id.
167. I.e. the quick-look test.
168. With the full version of the "rule of reason" test, the plaintiff bears the initial burden
of showing that the alleged pay-for-delay agreement had an actual negative effect on
competition. See Sprout, supra note 136, at 774. If the plaintiff does so, the burden shifts to the
defendant to prove the pro-competitive elements of the agreement. Id. If the defendant carries
this burden, the plaintiff must then prove that the same pro-competitive effects of the
agreement could be attained through alternative means that would be less anticompetitive. Id.
169. Id. at 774-75.
170. Id. at 774.
171. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236.
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comparison to that of the brand-name company or first-filing generic, is
unjustified. Put another way, rather than place a detailed evidentiary burden
on the plaintiff to prove the anticompetitive effects of pay-for-delay
agreements, this approach instead places the evidentiary burden on the
defendant to provide "empirical evidence of procompetitive effects" of the
agreement. Thus, it is clear that if South Carolina courts are unwilling to
adopt a per se approach to the validity of pay-for-delay agreements, they at
least need to utilize a modified rule of reason test that incorporates the
"quick-look" approach to instances where the anticompetitive effects of the
agreements are facially obvious.172
It is not unprecedented for a state court to apply a modified version of
the "rule of reason" test to evaluate the validity of a pay-for-delay agreement
in the post-Actavis landscape. For instance, the California Supreme Court in
Cipro took full advantage of Actavis' directive for lower courts to develop
the specific structure of the "rule of reason" test and utilized a modified
version of it' 73 that differs from the one this Note has proffered in the
preceding paragraph. Writing in regards to California's antitrust statutes
("The Cartwright Act"),1 74 the court first held that "[t]o the extent rule of
reason analysis applies, as we will conclude it does, we must also consider
how the analysis should be structured to most efficiently differentiate
between reasonable and unreasonable restraints of trade in this context."7 5
The court then sets out its preferred version of the rule of reason test - one
that places a large evidentiary burden on the plaintiff to set out a prima facie
case against the offending drug companies that the settlement at issue is
anticompetitive. 17 Should a prima facie case be made out by the plaintiff,
the burden then shifts to the defendant to offer legitimate justifications for
the agreement as well as evidence of the agreement's procompetitive
172. See id. at 777 (making the same argument and concluding that in situations that are
not facially obvious, the more thorough rule of reason analysis, as articulated by the Actavis
court, should be applied).
173. In re Cipro Cases I & II, 61 Cal. 4th 116, 151-61, 348 P.3d 845, 865-71. (2015),
reh'g denied (July 8, 2015).
174. See CA Bus. & Prof Code § 16720.
175. In re Cipro Cases I & II, 61 Cal. 4th at 148, 348 P.3d at 863 (emphasis added).
176. Id. at 151, 348 P.3d at 865. Specifically, to challenge a reverse payment patent
settlement under the antitrust statutes in California, a plaintiff must show evidence of the
following four elements: "(1) the settlement includes a limit on the settling generic challenger's
entry into the market; (2) the settlement includes cash or equivalent financial consideration
flowing from the brand to the generic challenger; and the consideration exceeds (3) the value
of goods and services other than any delay in market entry provided by the generic challenger
to the brand, as well as (4) the brand's expected remaining litigation costs absent settlement."
Id. (alteration in original).
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effects. If such justifications or instances of procompetitive effects are
offered by the defendant, the burden shifts back to the plaintiffs to prove that
the defendant's arguments are unsupported by empirical evidence.78 Thus,
the modified rule of reason test used in Cipro is a prime example of a state
court interpreting the test in the manner it best sees fit, and South Carolina
should strongly consider adopting its own version as well, as discussed
above.
Accordingly, given the above analysis of each subsection of South
Carolina's antitrust statute, combined with the anticompetitive factors
mentioned in Actavis and reviewed under an amalgamation of the "rule of
reason" test and the "quick-look" tests, it is clear that pay-for-delay
agreements should be found to violate South Carolina's antitrust statute
because they lessen the full and free competition of the sale of
pharmaceutical drugs in the state and therefore serve to control the price
structure of the drug market to the detriment of South Carolina's consumers.
2. ProceduralAnalysis Under § 39-3-10
The South Carolina antitrust statute provides for both public and private
action against those who violate its prohibition against agreements
unlawfully lessening competition. On the public side, the Attorney General
has the power, should a prima facie violation of the antitrust statute be
shown, to deny the offending corporation recognition under South Carolina
and to have its corporate charter revoked.179 On the private side, a consumer
who has been injured by corporate activity unlawfully lessening competition
under the antitrust statute has a personal right to a cause of action against the
offending corporation.80 Specifically, such a consumer has the right to
recover the full value that was paid for any good in which the sale is
ultimately controlled by the offending agreement. 181
The relevant state case law raises several issues that call into question
the feasibility of attacking pay-for-delay agreements under South Carolina's
antitrust statute. First and foremost is the issue of federal preemption.
Multiple courts have stated that, as a general rule, South Carolina courts
follow federal law in antitrust matters, and that an analysis of claims under
177. Id. at 157-58, 348 P.3d at 869-870.
178. Id. at 159-60, 348 P.3d at 871.
179. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-3-20 (2015).
180. Id. § 39-3-30.
181. Id
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federal antitrust law disposes of state law claims.182 In particular, the
Supreme Court of South Carolina has held that the state antitrust statute is
inapplicable to economic activity primarily interstate in nature.183 In the
landmark case from the Supreme Court of South Carolina, State v. Virginia-
Carolina Chemical Co., at issue was fertilizer being sold to South Carolina
consumers by a New Jersey corporation that manufactured its fertilizer in
Georgia, North Carolina, and Virginia. 8 4 South Carolina sued this
corporation for illegal monopolistic practices under a section of the South
Carolina antitrust statute allowing for suits involving "the importation or
sale of articles imported into this state."8 5 The Supreme Court struck down
this portion of the statute as unconstitutional and held that the state was
attempting "to exercise a prerogative of Congress to regulate interstate
commerce. No act of Congress has invested the state with authority to
interfere with this subject of commerce, and the police power cannot be
invoked for that purpose. The state has no power over importations of
articles of commerce."8 6 Connecting the Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co.
analysis to pay-for-delay agreements, it seems that if a brand-name company
in California entered into a pay-for-delay agreement to artificially control
the price of its drug that is purchased for sale by an individual consumer in
South Carolina, the activity would be considered interstate in nature and thus
beyond the scope of South Carolina's antitrust statutes.
Rather than accept that nearly all legislation regarding economic activity
occurring within South Carolina is preempted by federal law, South Carolina
courts should instead follow the approach that both Wisconsin and
California state courts have utilized over the past ten years. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court has stated that claims arising under Wisconsin's antitrust
statutes can reach interstate commerce claims "to some degree."87 More
specifically, Wisconsin state courts invoke the "adverse effects" test that
182. See generally In re Wiring Device Antitrust Litigation, 498 F. Supp. 79 (E.D.N.Y.
1980) (applying South Carolina law and concluding that South Carolina has "long adhered to a
policy following federal precedents in matters relating to state trade regulation enforcement");
Drs. Steuer & Latham, P.A. v. National Medical Enterprises, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 1489 (D.S.C.
1987) (concluding that in South Carolina an analysis of claims under federal antitrust law
disposes of state law claims).
183. See State v. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co., 71 S.C. 544, 51 S.E.2d 455 (1905)
(holding that the state antitrust statute is inapplicable to transactions dealing in interstate
commerce because such transactions solely within the purview of Congress).
184. Id. at 544, 51 S.E.2d at 455-56, 458.
185. Id. at 544, 51 S.E.2d at 461.
186. Id.
187. Meyers v. Bayer AG, Cayer Corp., 303 Wis.2d 295, 316, 735 N.W.2d 448, 459
(2007).
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"extend[s] the jurisdictional scope of Wisconsin antitrust law to unlawful
activity which has significantly and adversely affected trade and economic
competition within this state."88 In the California Supreme Court case
Cipro, the generic company at issue, Barr Pharmaceuticals, Inc., argued that
the plaintiffs' state antitrust claims were barred by the federal preemption
doctrine.8 9 The court took an extremely liberal approach to the preemption
doctrine, holding that the state law claims were not preempted because
"[s]tates have regulated against monopolies and unfair competition for
longer than the federal government, and federal law is intended only 'to
supplement, not displace, state antitrust remedies."'190 The court in Cipro
even went as far as suggesting that in the realm of state antitrust matters,
there is a presumption against application of the preemption doctrine.191
Applying these principles, the court rejected Barr Pharmaceutical's
argument that the state antitrust claims were preempted by federal law and
allowed the pay-for-delay agreement at issue to be scrutinized using state
law.192 Accordingly, South Carolina courts should adjust their preemption
doctrine in the mold of Wisconsin or California and adopt a liberal
preemption approach that allows for South Carolina to regulate certain
interstate conduct that has a significant adverse effect on trade and economic
competition within this state-including pay-for-delay agreements-to
better protect South Carolina consumers from antitrust violations.
The second issue that further calls into question the feasibility of
attacking pay-for-delay agreements under South Carolina's antitrust statute
-despite the fact that the individual consumer has a personal remedy from
violations arising under the antitrust statute-is that the South Carolina
Supreme Court has held that class action suits arising from such violations
are barred.19' Thus, the benefits to consumers from forming a class to take
on these big pharmaceutical companies, which were vital in the case of
Cipro, discussed supra, are unavailable to consumers in South Carolina.
Lastly, the Attorney General is unable to initiate a claim in state court
against an offending corporation and has weak enforcement powers under
188. Id. at 316-17, 735 N.W.2d at 459-60.
189. In re Cipro Cases I & II, 61 Cal. 4th 116, 160, 348 P.3d 845, 871. (2015), reh'g
denied (July 8, 2015).
190. Id. at 160, 348 P.3d at 871-72 (citing California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S.
93, 102 (1989)).
191. Id. at 161, 348 P.3d at 872.
192. Id. at 161-62, 348 P.3d at 872-73.
193. See General Supplies, Inc. v. Southwire Co., 276 S.C. 55, 59, 275 S.E.2d 579, 581
(1981) ("Absent a statutory direction to the contrary, the personal remedy provided for at
Section 39-3-30 may not be sought through a class suit.").
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the governing chapter of the antitrust statute, his ability to revoke the
corporate charter notwithstanding.194
Ultimately, the procedural weaknesses in the causes of action arising
from violations of South Carolina's antitrust statute greatly restrict the
feasibility of attacking pay-for-delay agreements on antitrust grounds, the
individual right to bring suit notwithstanding. The Attorney General has
relatively weak enforcement powers in relation to the procedural
mechanisms associated with other statutes discussed below, namely the
inability to initiate suit or to direct the Solicitor to initiate suit against
offending pharmaceutical companies for a violation of the statute.
Furthermore, this is the only statute that bars class action suits. It is true that,
in comparison to the other statutes at issue in this Note, the individual right
to bring suit is unique to the state antitrust statute. However, the likelihood
of an individual consumer taking on a massive pharmaceutical company is
hard to imagine and is unprecedented in case law involving state claims
against pay-for-delay agreements. Lastly, and most importantly, is the issue
of federal preemption and the fact that the South Carolina case law expresses
strong deference to federal law in antitrust claims. The relevant standard at
issue in which the statute applies-economic activities primarily intrastate in
nature-is evidence that a state court would be wary of deciding antitrust
claims based on pay-for-delay agreements. If South Carolina courts are
unwilling to adjust their preemption doctrine in the mold of California or
Wisconsin, then it will be difficult to bring a cause of action under South
Carolina's antitrust statutes.
B. Analysis Under §§ 39-3-110, 120 (Prohibition ofMonopolies)
Pay-for-delay agreements should be found to violate South Carolina's
prohibition against monopolies because they create a market structure
wherein the brand-name company dominates the marketplace as its sole
seller and, due to the agreement, faces no generic competition. Importantly,
although a brand-name company may have a valid monopoly due to patent-
protected exclusivity, this monopolization of the market ceases to be valid if
the company staves off generic competition through use of a pay-for-delay
agreement.
194. See §§ 39-3-20, 30.
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1. Substantive Analysis Under §§ 39-3-110, 120
There have only been two South Carolina cases decided under these
statutes, neither of which are relevant to this discussion.'95 Case law at the
federal level interpreting pay-for-delay agreements in the context of a
monopoly claim is equally sparse; however, there are several ongoing cases
in federal district courts that implicate such claims.196 As such, the
substantive analysis here will rely heavily on the statutory definition of
monopoly.197 The analysis will also incorporate the basic premise of Actavis
-namely, that although its holding was strictly narrowed to antitrust law,
the legal reasoning involving the potential anticompetitive effects of these
agreements that was used to arrive at that holding necessarily encompassed
analysis relevant to a discussion on monopolies.
Because state case law is sparse on the issue of monopolies, and
although South Carolina's statutes prohibiting monopolies are the relevant
law at issue, Section 2 of the Sherman Act' 98 is nevertheless helpful for
purposes of analyzing the illegality of pay-for-delay agreements in the
context of monopolies. Federal courts have interpreted Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, which prohibits corporations from "monopolizing" or
"attempting to monopolize"'99 as requiring plaintiffs to prove, in addition to
195. There are two cases from the United States District Court for the District of South
Carolina that briefly implicated § 39-3-120 in a minor way. See Trident Neuro-Imaging Lab. v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of S.C., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 1474 (D.S.C. 1983); Omni Outdoor
Advert., Inc. v. Columbia Outdoor Advert., Inc., 566 F. Supp. 1444 (D.S.C. 1983). Neither of
these cases is relevant to pay-for-delay agreements or concern an interpretation of South
Carolina's statutes prohibiting the formation of monopolies.
196. See, e.g., In Re Thalomid and Revlimid Antitrust Litigation, No.: 14-6997, 2015
WL 9589217 (D.N.J. Oct. 29, 2015) (reviewing plaintiffs' claims that the pharmaceutical
company at issue had maintained monopoly power through an anticompetitive pay-for-delay
agreement and refusing to dismiss plaintiffs' claims because they clearly enunciated a proper
cause of action with facts that, if proven to be true, would show the illegal formation of a
monopoly); United Food and Commercial Workers Local 1776 & Participating Employers
Health and Welfare Fund v. Teikoku Pharma USA, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 3d 1052 (N.D. Cal. 2014)
(entertaining plaintiffs' claims that the pharmaceutical company at issue had maintained
monopoly power through an anticompetitive pay-for-delay agreement but ultimately finding
that the plaintiffs' failed to sufficiently allege that the branded company had monopoly
power); In re Aggrenox Antitrust Litigation, 94 F. Supp. 3d. 224 (D. Conn. 2015) (refusing to
dismiss plaintiffs' claims that the branded pharmaceutical company at issue had monopoly
power due to a pay-for-delay agreement where the branded company was able to charge supra-
competitive prices for its drug "in a market with no cross-elasticity of demand with other
drugs").
197. A monopoly is statutorily defined as a market structure wherein there is only a
single seller that faces little to no competition. § 39-3-110.
198. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
199. Id.
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the branded company's possession of monopoly power in the relevant
market, "the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior
product, business acumen, or historic accident."200 This second element of
Section 2-that the acquisition of monopoly power be "willful"-is
extremely important because
"[t]he opportunity to charge monopoly prices-at least for a short
period-is what attracts 'business acumen' in the first place; it
induces risk taking that produces innovation and economic growth.
. . [therefore] the possession of monopoly power will not be found
unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element of anticompetitive
conduct."201
Pay-for-delay agreements should be found to violate the plain language
of South Carolina's statutory prohibition of monopolies because they create
a market structure wherein the brand-name company continues to dominate
as the sole seller at the exclusion of perfectly viable generic competitors.
These agreements violate the plain language of South Carolina's
"definitions" statute202 for monopolies because they involve two or more
corporations combining capital to accomplish a purpose forbidden by the
statute. The illegal combination of capital is the continued market
dominance for the brand-name company on the one hand, and the reverse
settlement payment and future 180-day market exclusivity period for the
first-filing generic company on the other. The purpose of the agreements is
to create a restraint on trade by excluding generic competition from entering
the marketplace-a purpose that is specifically forbidden by the plain
language of the statute.203 Thus, according to a proper and strict construction
of § 39-3-110, pay-for-delay agreements should be considered in direct
violation of South Carolina's prohibition against monopolies and therefore
unlawful and void as against public policy. An offending drug company
participating in such an agreement within South Carolina would therefore be
guilty of a conspiracy to defraud.204
200. U.S. v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
201. Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Tinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 407 (2004) (emphasis added).
202. § 39-3-110.
203. The forbidden acts or purposes referred to in the definitions statute are those which
constitute violations under Article 3 (ex: illegal restraint on trade, pricing, etc.). See § 39-3-
180.
204. See id. § 39-3-110.
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A prime example of the potentially illegal creation of such a monopoly
is the pay-for-delay agreement involving Bayer AG and four other generic
drug companies that was the subject of the landmark Cipro case from
205California. In that agreement, the allegedly illegal combination of capital
involved Bayer AG receiving continued market dominance over the sale of
Cipro (ciprofloxacin)-market dominance that protected over $1 billion in
sales over the life of the agreement in exchange for a payment of $398
206million to four generic challengers. The purpose of the agreement was
simple: Bayer wanted to continue monopolizing the market for one its best-
selling drugs by restraining trade through the exclusion of all generic
207competitors. The importance of this monopoly to Bayer cannot be
understated: prior to generic entry, Bayer was able to charge a staggering
201$346 for Cipro. Upon generic entry, this price plunged to $23.
The foregoing analysis comports with the federal courts' interpretation
of monopolies in the context of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The first
element of Section 2 that a plaintiff must satisfy that the corporation
possess monopoly power in the relevant market209_iS easy to apply to pay-
for-delay agreements. Brand-name drug companies of course enjoy patent-
protected monopoly power in the respective segment of the pharmaceutical
drug market that the drug occupies, as well they should.210 However, brand-
205. See In re Cipro Cases I & II, 61 Cal. 4th 116, 348 P.3d 845 (2015).
206. Id. at 132-33, 348 P.3d at 852.
207. See Melissa Lipman, Bayer to Pay $74M to Settle Cipro Pay-For-Delay Fight,
LAw360 (July 12, 2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/456917/bayer-to-pay-74m-to-settle-
cipro-pay-for-delay-fight.
208. See COMMUNITY CATALYST & U.S. PIRG, supra note 71.
209. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
210. Were the pioneer drug-company unable to definitively rely on the legal protection of
its patent, no company would be incentivized to spend the millions of dollars and decades of
research necessary to bring innovative new drugs to the market. See Mehl, supra note 77, at
649. Pioneer companies must also contend with the fact that only a few of their drugs-only a
handful of the hundreds of different prototypes that the companies have invested hundreds of
millions of dollars in will receive FDA approval. See Josh Bloom, Should Patents on
Pharmaceuticals Be Extended to Encourage Innovation?, WALL STREET J. (Jan. 23, 2012),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204542404577156993191655000. Put
simply, it is certainly understandable for a drug company with a valid and strong patent to
want to protect its investment through full legal recognition of said patent. This Note takes no
issue with such a stance and would instead point out that the Hatch-Waxman Act encourages
generic companies to challenge weak and potentially invalid patents, see 149 CONG. REC.
16104 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 2003) (statement by Sen. Hatch) (emphasis added). Were a generic
drug company to challenge a strong and valid patent, the brand-name company would have
nothing to worry about because it would almost certain win in the ensuing patent litigation. See
PAY-FOR-DELAY, supra note 31 (noting that the FTC issued a study which found that generics
prevailed in in 73% of the patent litigation that ended with a decision by the court).
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name companies must defend the validity of this monopoly should a generic
company file a Paragraph IV ANDA. Should the branded company extend
its monopoly by entering into a pay-for-delay agreement in lieu of litigating
the validity of its patent, said monopoly is no longer valid as conceived by
the authors of the Hatch-Waxman Act.211 Thus, it is clear that within the
framework of the first element of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, the branded
company possesses monopoly power both before the pay-for-delay
agreement212 and, most importantly, after the pay-for-delay agreement.213
Next, it is overwhelmingly clear that pay-for-delay agreements violate
the second element of the Sherman Act214 because the agreements constitute
an effort by the brand-name company to willfully possess monopoly market
power that either exceeds the scope of the patent or wrongfully protects a
weak patent from challenges by generic competitors. Such monopoly power
granted by these agreements is therefore not the consequence of growth in
the market due to a superior product,215 legally valid business acumen,216 or
211. See generally 149 CONG. REC. 16104 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 2003) (statement by Sen.
Hatch) (noting that the primary purpose of Paragraph IV certification's inclusion in the Act
was to allow generic companies to immediately challenge weak and invalid brand-name
patents so that generic alternatives would reach the market in a quicker fashion). Thus, the
ultimate goal of the Hatch-Waxman Act more efficiently getting generic alternatives in the
hands of consumers-is thwarted by these pay-for-delay agreements.
212. This power comes by way of its exclusivity patent. See PATENTS AND
EXCLUSIVITY, FDA/CDER SBIA CHRONICLES 1 (May 19, 2015),
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/SmallBusinessAssistance/ucm2995
60.htm.
213. This power comes by way of the pay-for-delay agreement i.e. providing a large
reverse settlement payment to the generic challenger(s) at issue in exchange for continued
market exclusivity. See HUTT, supra note 26, at 1016.
214. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (stating that the acquisition of monopoly power must be
"willful").
215. The monopoly power is certainly not a consequence of the branded drug's higher
quality. The FDA forbids such an event from occurring. In order to submit an ANDA to begin
the FDA approval process, the generic drug company must demonstrate "bioequivalence"
wherein the generic drug is compared to a "reference listed drug." See Abbreviated New Drug
Application: Generics, supra note 79. See also FDA, Drugs@FDA Glossary of Terms, supra
note 79. A reference listed drug is defined as an FDA-approved drug to which generic drugs
are compared in order to show that a particular generic drug is bioequivalent to the FDA-
approved drug. See FDA, Drugs@FDA Glossary of Terms, supra note 79. As such, because
the generic drugs must by law be of the exact same quality as the branded drug, the branded
drug surely does not acquire natural monopoly power due to its superiority as a product over
the generic alternative.
216. While it may be "good business acumen" for the branded company and the generic
companies at issue to enter into the pay-for-delay agreement, such behavior, as this Note
argues, is both anticompetitive and should be considered illegal. Thus, to the extent that
entering into these agreements is all but per se illegal, there is no argument to be made that
entering into these agreements connotes "good business acumen." Moreover, even if subjected
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historic accident. The monopoly power is instead granted through the
anticompetitive conduct of willfully entering into a pay-for-delay agreement
for the purpose of preventing generic competitors from entering the market.
These exact same arguments are currently being examined in the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey within the context of a
claim under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.217 In that case, a class of
consumers are alleging that the brand-name drug company Celgene willfully
maintained its monopoly power over two of its drugs - Thalomid
(thalidomide) and Revlimid (lenalidomide) - through the anticompetitive
act of entering into a pay-for-delay agreement that allowed it to exclude
generic competitors and charge supra-competitive prices without fear of
losing sales.218 Thus, the plaintiffs allege that "Celgene did not maintain its
monopoly power through 'meritorious competition' but did so through
unlawful, willful exclusionary conduct violating federal and state laws."2 19
Importantly, the court harshly rebuked Celgene's attempt to have the
plaintiffs' claims dismissed on summary judgment, stating that the plaintiffs'
allegations
"allow the Court to infer that Celgene willfully sought to maintain
its monopoly in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act in order
to charge supracompetitive prices, not through business acumen or a
superior product, but through a concerted effort to deny potential
generic competitors access to the market."220
Thus, this case is a clear indication that pay-for-delay agreements
are vulnerable to attack on the grounds that they are an illegal attempt to
form a monopoly.
Accordingly, pay-for-delay agreements should be found to violate South
Carolina's prohibition against monopolies because the agreements violate
the plain language of the statute and further qualify as potential violations of
federal law as interpreted by the federal courts.
to the highly deferential "rule of reason" analysis, it would be difficult for a court to see the
economic suffering of local officials or a class of consumers or even a single consumer and
conclude that entering into these agreements is representative "good business acumen."
217. See In Re Thalomid and Revlimid Antitrust Litigation, No.: 14-6997, 2015 WL
9589217 (D.N.J. Oct. 29, 2015).
218. Idat 4.
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2. Procedural Analysis Under §§ 39-3-110, 120
The South Carolina statutes that prohibit the formation of monopolies
provide for both private and public action against those who violate its
221prohibition against agreements unlawfully lessening competition. On the
public side, the Attorney General has the power to revoke the corporate
rights of a company should it violate the prohibition on monopolies,222
including those rights belonging to foreign corporations doing business in
223South Carolina. The state also has the power to fine a corporation for such
violations, with the resultant funds deposited into the State Treasury.224
Perhaps the most important avenue for public legal recourse is found in the
Solicitor's power to bring suit in the circuit courts of South Carolina 22 an
avenue not found for public legal recourse of violations of South Carolina's
antitrust statute. On the private side, there are two important areas of
difference between the statutes prohibiting monopolies and the antitrust
statute. Class action suits are not prohibited for violations arising under § 39-
3-110,226 which is a major difference from the complete bar on class action
suits under the antitrust statute. Another important difference is that injured
individual consumers do not have a personal right to bring a claim against a
221. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 39-3-160 to 190 (2015).
222. Id. § 39-3-160.
223. Id. § 39-3-170. Any corporation organized under the laws of another state or
country that violates South Carolina's prohibition of monopolies will lose all rights and
privileges to do business within South Carolina. Id.
224. Id. § 39-3-180. These fines can actually be quite substantial, especially if the
offending corporation does not take immediate action to remedy its violations (i.e. dissolve its
illegally-formed monopoly). See id. Specifically, the statute provides that an offending
corporation "shall forfeit not less than two hundred dollars, nor more than five thousand
dollars, for every such offense and each day such person shall continue to do so shall be a
separate offense, the penalties in such cases to be recovered by an action in the name of the
State, at the relation of the Attorney General or the solicitor of the judicial circuit within which
the offense was committed." Id.
225. Id. § 39-3-190. Specifically, the statute provides that "the Attorney General and the
solicitor of each circuit in which an offense is committed, respectively, shall enforce the
provisions of this article." Id. The Solicitor is in charge of instituting and conducting lawsuits
in the circuit courts. Id. The Attorney General is in charge of prosecuting those lawsuits that
are appealed to the state Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court of South Carolina. Id. The
solicitor shall institute and conduct all suits begun in the circuit courts and upon appeal the
Attorney General shall prosecute the suits in the Supreme Court or the court of appeals. Id.
226. While there is nothing in South Carolina's statutory provisions or case law
expressly stating that class action lawsuits are permitted for violations of the state's prohibition
of monopolies, there is also no evidence in those sources that suggests such lawsuits are
barred. The Supreme Court in General Supplies, Inc. v. Southwire Co., 276 S.C. 55, 275
S.E.2d 579 (1981), which held that class action lawsuits under South Carolina's antitrust
statute were barred, explicitly limited its holding to antitrust matters.
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corporation allegedly participating in a monopoly.227 Importantly, because
these statutory provisions technically fall under the umbrella of South
Carolina's "antitrust statutes," the same federal preemption issues discussed
in Part III.A.ii are also present here. Thus, if South Carolina courts are
unwilling to adjust their preemption doctrine in the mold of California or
Wisconsin, then it will be difficult to bring a cause of action under South
Carolina's statutory prohibition of monopolies.
On balance, the procedural causes of action arising from violations of
South Carolina's statutory prohibition of monopolies are much stronger than
those of the state's antitrust statute, notwithstanding its similar issues with
federal preemption. This is primarily because the Solicitor, with the
authority of the Attorney General, has the unrestrained right to bring suit in
the circuit courts of South Carolina against an offending pharmaceutical
drug company. This means the Solicitor, with full backing of the state
government and all of the funds and resources such backing entails, can
attack pay-for-delay agreements as the formation of prohibited monopolies
which are unlawful and void as against public policy. The strength of this
public remedy cannot be overstated; indeed, it is enough to overcome the
only substantial procedural weakness of this statute-the inability for
individual consumers to bring a cause of action against offending
pharmaceutical drug companies. This individual right, granted under the
state's antitrust statute, is important because it means the power to attack
these agreements will not be at the whim of the political winds within the
state.228 However, the negative effects of a lack of an individual right to
bring suit are mitigated by the allowance of class action suits against
offending corporations for their illegal formation of monopolies.
Accordingly, the strong enforcement rights held by the Attorney
General and the Solicitor, in combination with the right to pursue class
actions suits, signify the procedural strengths in the causes of action arising
from violations of the state's prohibition of monopolies.
227. For the state's antitrust statute, there is an explicit provision, § 39-3-30, allowing for
a personal right to a cause of action against offending corporations. There is no such
accompanying provision for the state's prohibition of monopolies.
228. Any such potential fears are, however, substantially mitigated upon consideration of
the fact that the South Carolina Attorney General decided in 2011 to sign onto an amicus brief
filed in a federal law suit attacking pay-for-delay agreements in which the amicus brief
advocated for the prohibition of pay-for-delay agreements. See Karmasek, supra note 52.
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C. Analysis Under § 39-3-130 (Prohibition of Illegal Restraints on
Trade)
Pay-for-delay agreements should be found to violate South Carolina's
prohibition against illegal restraints on trade because they fix the price of the
brand-name drug by protecting it from generic competition and thus
preventing the price from dropping to its market equilibrium.
1. Substantive Analysis Under § 39-3-130
There have been very few cases at either the state or federal level that
have cited, much less examined, South Carolina's statute prohibiting illegal
restraints of trade.229 Thus, similar to the analysis in Part JJ.B, the analysis
here will rely heavily on the plain language of the statute. Furthermore, the
legal reasoning employed in Actavis-namely the Court's focus on
evaluating the potential anticompetitive effects of pay-for-delay agreements
-is particularly applicable to this statute because it emphasizes that such
agreements are considered illegal when they have the effect of unreasonably
restraining trade through a large and unjustified reverse settlement
payment.230
The Supreme Court of South Carolina has provided some implicit
guidance on this issue by enunciating the appropriate test for courts to use
when determining the reasonableness of a partial restraint of trade.231 The
Court stated that the reasonableness of a restraint on trade turns on "whether
[the restraint] affords only a fair protection to the interests of the party in
whose favor it is made, without being so large in its operations as to interfere
with the interests of the public."2 32 Additionally, similar to the analysis of
the state's statutory prohibition on monopolies,233 it is useful to look to the
federal level for help in interpreting what exactly constitutes an illegal
229. In fact, there has been only one state case decided under this statute, and it was
decided on grounds irrelevant to the analysis at hand. See generally McMillan v. Oconee
Memorial Hosp., Inc., 367 S.C. 559, 626 S.E.2d 884 (2006) (noting that a civil conspiracy
requires two or more persons and that, because one of the parties at issue was involved in a
principal-agent relationship, he did not qualify as the second person needed to satisfy a civil
conspiracy).
230. See F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2235 (2013) (noting that the restraint on
trade caused by pay-for-delay agreements "has the 'potential for genuine adverse effects on
competition"').
231. See Walter A. Wood Mowing & Reaping Co. v. Greenwood Hardware Co., 75 S.C.
378, 55 S.E.2d 973 (1906).
232. Id. at 378, 55 S.E.2d at 976.
233. See Part III.B.
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restraint on trade. Here, the Sherman Act, in particular Section 1,234 provides
that federal complainants pursuing a claim alleging anticompetitive acts in
violation of the Act's restraint-of-trade provision must prove the following
two elements: (1) that two persons or corporations were acting in concert to
carry out such acts; and (2) that the restraint being complained of is
sufficiently indefensible such that it constitutes an unreasonable restraint on
trade.235
First, in analyzing the plain language of the statute within the context of
a pay-for-delay agreement, it is clear that these agreements inherently
involve two corporations coming to an agreement with the intent of
regulating and fixing the price of pharmaceutical drugs sold and
manufactured within the state of South Carolina. The brand-name drug
company, absent the entry of generic competitors, has absolutely no
incentive to reduce the price of its drug. The profits brand-name drug
236companies are able to reap from this market exclusivity are enormous, and
these companies are willing to pursue any trade restraints in an attempt to
lock in this standard-setting price. Enter pay-for-delay agreements. Although
the company must pay an enormous reverse settlement payment in order to
convince the first-filing generic to temporarily halt his Paragraph IV ANDA
challenge, this payment pales in comparison to the billions of dollars in
profits the brand-name company receives by not being forced to reduce its
237
price. The first-filing generic company is clearly at fault as well in
234. 15 U.S.C. §1 (2012).
235. See Robertson v. Sea Pines Real Estate Companies, Inc., 679 F.3d 278 (4th Cir.
2012); Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193 (4th Cir. 2002).
236. For instance, Bayer collected over $1 billion due to the extended monopoly it gained
by engaging in a pay-for-delay agreement. See In re Cipro Cases I & II, 61 Cal. 4th 116, 348
P.3d 845 (2015). Provigil's (modanifil) profits for the year 2005-the year Ms. Winkler began
taking the brand-name medicine were $475 million. See Thompson, supra note 1. Zantac
(ranitidine), a branded drug used to treat digestive disorders, made $2.9 billion the year
preceding generic entry. See COMMUNITY CATALYST & U.S. PIRG, supra note 71. Lipitor
(atorvastatin), a branded drug used to treat high cholesterol and heart disease, made $7.4
billion the year preceding generic entry. Id.
237. Stunningly, this point is best made by the CEO of a brand-name company. See
Zachary Roth, Drug Makers Paying Qff Competitors to Keep Cheap Generics Off Market,
TALKING POINTS MEMO (Dec. 2, 2009), http://talkingpointsmemo.com/muckraker/drug-
makers-paying-off-competitors-to-keep-cheap-generics-off-market. Frank Baldino, the CEO of
Cephalon, maker of Provigil (modanifil), granted a 2006 interview in which he boasted of
recent deals with four generic drug-makers that kept generic versions of Provigil off the
market until 2012. Id. Baldino declared: "We were able to get six more years of patent
protection. That's $4 billion in sales that no one expected." Id. Of course, in 2015, the FTC
would settle with Cephalon on behalf of affected consumers for $1.2 billion in connection with
the pay-for-delay agreements referenced by its former CEO. See Press Release, Fed. Trade
Comm'n, supra note 8.
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creating the illegal restraint on trade-it is delaying its lucrative 180-day
market exclusivity period in favor of receiving a huge payment from the
brand-name company. This may be a perfectly sound economic decision for
the parties involved; however, it represents an illegal restraint of trade that
serves to regulate and fix the price of pharmaceutical drugs, and is therefore
in direct violation of the plain language of the statute.
This illegal restraint of trade is best embodied through the so-called
"bottleneck" effect that occurs when the first-filing generic chooses to enter
a pay-for-delay agreement rather than successfully litigate the validity of the
branded patent. Because the pay-for-delay agreement precludes judicial
determination of the branded patent's validity, the FDA is unable to approve
the first-filing generic's ANDA until the pay-for-delay agreement has
expired.238 Herein lies the issue: only the first-filing generic qualifies for the
180-day market exclusivity period, and no other generic company can enter
the market until the first-filing generic has exhausted its exclusivity
period.239 As a result, in the event of a pay-for-delay agreement, it could be
years before the first-filing generic exhausts its exclusivity period such that
the FDA would be able to resume approving ANDAs from other generic
companies. As a result of these procedural loopholes in the Hatch-Waxman
Act, a "bottleneck" occurs wherein multiple ANDAs from generic
competitors lay dormant with the FDA.240 The lack of generic entry thus
prevents the branded drug's price from dropping to its market
equilibrium -essentially the definition of an unfair restraint on trade.
Viewing pay-for-delay agreements in light of this clear restraint on trade,
Senator Hatch, co-author of the Hatch-Waxman Act, stated that he "finds
these types of reverse payment collusive arrangements appalling."242
The application of the Supreme Court of South Carolina's test243 in
determining the reasonableness of a restraint on trade is implicitly answered
238. See Avery, supra note 80, at 181.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. A prime of example of this involves Ms. Winkler and her six-month prescription of
the branded drug Provigil (modafinil). See Thompson, supra note 1. The price of a six-month
supply of fell from $700 the price Ms. Winkler faced with no available generic-to its
market equilibrium price of $32. Id. Another example is Lipitor (atorvastatin), which cost
consumers $205 for a thirty-day supply. See COMMUNITY CATALYST & U.S. PIRG, supra note
71. Now that the generic version is available, it costs $18 for a thirty-day supply. Id.
242. 148 CONG. REC. S7566 (daily ed. July 30, 2002) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
243. See Walter A. Wood Mowing & Reaping Co. v. Greenwood Hardware Co., 75 S.C.
378, 55 S.E.2d 973, 976 (1906) (stating that whether a restraint of trade is reasonable turns on
"whether [the restraint] affords only a fair protection to the interests of the party in whose
favor it is made, without being so large in its operations as to interfere with the interests of the
public").
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within the analysis of the preceding paragraph. First, to enunciate the
argument using the direct rule language found in the test itself, it is clear that
pay-for-delay agreements operate as a restraint on trade and serve to benefit
and protect the interests of the parties involved in the agreement; however,
such a restraint on trade is large enough such that its operations clearly
interfere with the interests of the public. The agreements benefit each party
as follows: (1) the brand-name company continues to operate as the sole
seller in the market and reaps enormous profits because it does not have to
lower the price of its drug; and (2) the first-filing generic company receives
a massive reverse settlement payment, does not have to worry about other
generic competitors entering the market, and can still enjoy its 180-day
market exclusivity period once the reverse settlement provides that its drug
can enter the market. However, the range of benefits extending from this
agreement is strictly confined to the drug companies that are parties to the
agreement.
The public-i.e. the individual consumers of the pharmaceutical
drugs-certainly receive no benefits from the absence of generic alternatives
and the astronomical prices of branded drugs that result from said absence.
As noted above, a report found that restricting generic access to South
Carolina consumers has a devastating impact on their finances, as generic
244prescription medicines saved South Carolinians $3.7 billion in 2015. At
the national level, per capita health care spending in 2014 was estimated at
245$9,523. In 2005, the annual generic drug savings in the United States was
246roughly $87 billion. This number pales in comparison to the $254 billion
in generic drug savings in 2014.247 Pay-for-delay agreements should
therefore be viewed as an unreasonable restraint on trade under the test
enunciated by the Supreme Court of South Carolina because they stifle the
availability of generic alternatives such that it operates as such a large
restraint on trade that its operations clearly have a negative impact on the
interests of the public and benefit only the drug companies that are parties to
the agreements.
As a last point of emphasis that pay-for-delay agreements should be
found to violate South Carolina's prohibition against illegal restraints of
trade, it is helpful to look at the federal law dealing with restraints on trade,
found in Section 1 of the Sherman Act,248 discussed supra. Here, the
244. See GENERIC PHARM. Ass'N, supra note 37, at 17.
245. Id. at 4.
246. Id. at 1.
247. Id.
248. 15 U.S.C. §1 (2012).
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249
foregoing analysis of the agreements proves each of the two elements
necessary for a valid claim under the Act. Specifically, in a pay-for-delay
agreement, two or more corporations act in concert to ensure that the brand-
name company can continue monopolizing its segment of the market at the
exclusion of generic competition provided the brand company makes a large
reverse settlement payment to the agreeing generic companies. Such a
restraint on trade, as argued above, is entirely and indefensibly unreasonable
due to its crippling effects on the health care costs of individual consumers.
Thus, an interpretation of pay-for-delay agreements within the federal
framework confirms that the agreements fit the appropriate criteria for
determining whether a business practice constitutes an unreasonable restraint
of trade.
Accordingly, pay-for-delay agreements should be found to violate South
Carolina's statutory prohibition against illegal restraints on trade because
they fix the price of the brand-name drug by protecting it from generic
competition and thus preventing the price from dropping to its market
equilibrium.
2. ProceduralAnalysis Under § 39-3-130
The procedural avenues for initiating legal action arising from violations
of § 39-3-130 are identical to those arising from violations of South
Carolina's statutory prohibition of monopolies and need not be restated
here.250 For a complete analysis of the causes of action available under this
statute, refer to Part III.C.ii of this Note. Importantly, because this statutory
provision technically falls under the umbrella of South Carolina's "antitrust
statutes," the same federal preemption issues discussed in regards to both the
state's main antitrust statute251 and statutory prohibition of monopolies252 are
also present here. Thus, if South Carolina courts are unwilling to adjust their
preemption doctrine in the mold of California or Wisconsin, then it will be
difficult to bring a cause of action under South Carolina's statutory
prohibition of illegal restraints on trade.
249. See id. See also Robertson v. Sea Pines Real Estate Companies, Inc., 679 F.3d 278
(4th Cir. 2012) (noting that the two elements required to be proven for a violation of Section 1
of the Sherman Act are as follows: (1) that two persons or corporations were acting in concert
to carry out such acts; and (2) that the restraint being complained of is sufficiently indefensible
such that it constitutes an unreasonable restraint on trade).
250. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 39-3-160 to 190 (2015).
251. See Part III.A.ii.
252. See Part III.B.ii.
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D. Analysis Under § 39-5-20 (Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices)
Pay-for-delay settlements should be found to violate South Carolina's
prohibition against unfair trade practices because the practice of stifling
generic competition and artificially controlling the price of a brand-name
drug is patently unfair.
1. Substantive Analysis Under § 39-5-20
There have been a large number of South Carolina cases decided under
this statute, which is unsurprising given that it is the heart of the South
Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act ("SCUTPA"). 3 Unlike the three
statutes previously discussed, the analysis of pay-for-delay agreements under
SCUTPA relies almost exclusively on well-developed principles elucidated
from South Carolina case law. However, the analysis will also draw on
arguments currently being made in two pending federal district court cases
wherein the plaintiffs' are challenging pay-for-delay agreement under their
respective state statutes prohibiting unfair and deceptive trade practices
254both of which recently survived a motion to dismiss. Moreover, the
analysis will also implicitly incorporate the basic premise of Actavis-
namely, that although its holding was strictly narrowed to antitrust law, the
legal reasoning involving the potential anticompetitive effects of these
agreements, which was used to arrive at that holding, necessarily
encompassed analysis relevant to a discussion of the agreements as a product
of an unfair trade practice.
Per the Supreme Court of South Carolina, the plaintiff must prove the
following three elements in order to bring an action under the SCUTPA: (1)
that the defendant engaged in an unlawful trade practice, (2) that the plaintiff
suffered actual, ascertainable damages as a result of the defendant's use of
the unlawful trade practice, and (3) that the unlawful trade practice engaged
in by the defendant had an adverse impact on the public interest.255 The
South Carolina Court of Appeals has further opined that, under the
SCUTPA, "[a] trade practice is 'unfair' when it is offensive to the public
253. According to Westlaw Next, there have been 94 state court cases adjudicated under
§ 39-5-20.
254. See In Re Thalomid and Revlimid Antitrust Litigation, No. CV V146997KSHCLW,
2015 WL 9589217 (D.N.J. Oct. 29, 2015); In re Niaspan Antitrust Litigation, 42 F. Supp. 3d
735 (E.D. Pa. 2014). Both of these cases will be discussed in detail below.
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policy or when it is immoral, unethical, or oppressive."256 One of the ways a
plaintiff may show that unfair or deceptive acts or practices have an impact
257upon the public interest is by demonstrating a potential for repetition. The
potential for repetition is generally demonstrated in one of two ways: "(1) by
showing the same kind of actions occurred in the past, thus making it likely
they will continue to occur absent deterrence; or (2) by showing the
company's procedures create a potential for repetition of the unfair and
deceptive acts."258
There are two cases currently pending in two separate federal district
courts wherein the plaintiffs are alleging, inter alia, that the pay-for-delay
agreements entered into by the respective branded drug companies at issue
constitute an unfair and deceptive trade practice under state law.259 The first
case, currently pending in the United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey, involves a class of consumers alleging that the brand-name drug
company at issue, Celgene, entered into confidential pay-for-delay
agreements to prevent generic versions of its branded drug Thalomid from
260entering into the market. One of the main arguments proffered by the class
is that the agreement constitutes an unfair and deceptive trade practice under
261New Jersey state law. Specifically, the plaintiffs point to Celgene's
lawsuit in 2007 in response to a generic company's Paragraph IV
Certification.262 During the thirty-month stay triggered by Celgene's patent
infringement suit, Celgene entered into a pay-for-delay agreement hat "had
the anti-competitive effect of keeping generic alternatives to Thalomid off
the market."263 Celgene moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' claim on the basis
that the complaint failed to allege sufficient factual evidence that, even if
taken to be true, would constitute a claim under New Jersey's statute
264prohibiting unfair or deceptive trade practices. Importantly, the district
256. Young v. Century Lincoln-Mercury, 302 S.C. 320, 325, 396 S.E.2d 105, 107 (Ct.
App. 1989) (rev'd on other grounds).
257. See Singleton v. Stokes Motors, Inc., 358 S.C. 369, 379, 395 S.E.2d 461, 465
(2004).
258. Id.
259. See In Re Thalomid and Revlimid Antitrust Litigation, No. CV146997KSHCLW,
2015 WL 9589217, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 29, 2015); In re Niaspan Antitrust Litigation, 42 F.
Supp. 3d at 735.
260. In Re ThalomidandRevlimidAntitrust Li igation, 2015 WL 9589217, at *5.
261. Id. at 8.
262. Id. at 7.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 1.
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court judge refused to grant Celgene's motion to dismiss, and the case is
265
currently still pending in the District Court of New Jersey.
The second case, currently pending in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, involves multidistrict litigation
wherein the plaintiffs-purchasers are alleging, inter alia, that the pay-for-
delay agreement entered into by the brand-name company Kos
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. constitutes deceptive or unfair trade conduct under the
statutes of the following states: New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Minnesota,
266Pennsylvania, and Virginia. Specifically, in 2005, Kos Pharmaceuticals
entered into a pay-for-delay agreement with the generic company at issue in
order to end the patent litigation it had initiated in response to a Paragraph
267IV Certification. This agreement had the effect of precluding the generic
version of the brand drug from entering the market.268 Kos Pharmaceuticals
filed a motion to dismiss alleging, among other things, that the state
consumer protection statutes at issue were not broad enough to encompass a
pay-for-delay agreement as an unfair trade practice.269 Importantly, the
district court judge denied this motion as to the plaintiffs' claims under the
state statutes of New Hampshire and Rhode Island, holding that a broad
construction of those statutes would permit them to regulate the
270anticompetitive effects of a pay-for-delay agreement.
Accordingly, there are two recent federal district court cases in which
the plaintiffs at issue are making persuasive arguments that pay-for-delay
agreements can constitute an unfair or deceptive trade practice under state
statutes so long as a broad construction of the statute is permitted. As such,
the SCUTPA should be interpreted by courts in South Carolina much in the
same manner as the federal district courts did in each of the respective cases
addressed above. Given the language of the SCUTPA, branded companies
violate its provisions when they engage in a pay-for-delay agreement that
affects the sale of a drug within the state of South Carolina. The terms
"trade" and "commerce" as used within the statute are plainly broad enough
to include the sale of pharmaceutical drugs that, by their purchase and
271consumption, directly affect the individual consumers in South Carolina.
265. Id. at 18-20.
266. See In re Niaspan Antitrust Litigation, 42 F. Supp. 3d at 760-62.
267. Id. at 740.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 760-61.
270. Id
271. See S.C. CODE ANN § 39-5-10(b) (2015) (stating that "the advertising, offering for
sale, sale, or distributing of ... any commodity or thing of value wherever situate, and shall
include any trade or commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people of this state").
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Thus, similar to how the courts in the aforementioned district court cases
refused to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims that the brand company at issue
violated the respective state consumer protection statute because of the
broad language used in those statutes, a court in South Carolina should do
the same if faced with a similar claim. This is because the broad language of
the SCUTPA-in particular the terms "unfair or deceptive trade practice,"
"trade," and "commerce" as they are so used is sufficient to encompass
pay-for-delay agreements.
First, it is clear that brand-name pharmaceutical companies participating
in pay-for-delay agreements should be found to violate each element
necessary to bring a cause of action under SCUTPA. First, a plaintiff will
likely be able to prove that the brand-name company has engaged in an
unlawful business practice because it will have kept the price of its drug
artificially high or in some cases even inflating the drug price-through
the unfair method of paying off the generic competitors so they will not
enter the market. For instance, Cephalon was able to artificially inflate the
price of a six-month supply of Provigil from $300 to a staggering $700
solely because it entered into a pay-for-delay agreement with the generic
challenger at issue that precluded its entry into the marketplace in exchange
272for a massive reverse settlement payment. As soon as the effects of the
unfair trade practice wore off and generic competitors could enter the
marketplace, the price of a six-month supply of Provigil plummeted to
273$32. Second, it is clear that consumers suffer actual, ascertainable
damages as a result of pay-for-delay agreements because they are forced to
pay enormous prices for branded drugs simply because an unfair trade
practice has precluded the availability of generic alternatives. Here, it is
worth remembering that generic prescription medicines saved South
274Carolinians $3.7 billion in 2015, and that individual consumers in South
Carolina face up to a 1400 % increase in their out-of-pocket medical
275expenses through the lack of generic alternatives. Lastly, it has already
been proven that pay-for-delay agreements are injurious to the public
interest because health care costs borne by the average American family
272. See Thompson, supra note 1.
273. Id.
274. See GENERIC PHARM. Ass'N, supra note 37, at 17.
275. See Part IIA; see also GENERIC PHARM. Ass'N, supra note 37, at 11. In the
example provided in Part II.A., a South Carolina consumer, with full access to generic
alternatives, would pay roughly $13.62 per month in total for all four generic drugs at issue in
the example. See id. at 11. Without access to generic alternatives, this same South Carolina
consumer would instead be faced with a monthly out-of-pocket cost of $210.96 for the
branded version of the same four drugs. Id.
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continue to increase. For instance, at the national level, per capita health care
spending in 2014 was estimated at $9,523.276 Given the enormous savings
incurred by consumers via access to generic alternatives, it is clear that pay-
for-delay agreements are injurious to the public interest because it is
manifestly immoral and oppressive to force low-income consumers to
choose between either draining their family's savings to afford a brand drug
or choosing to forgo life-altering treatment.
Additionally, pay-for-delay agreements impact the public interest
because there is a high probability that both branded and generic companies
will repeat their actions absent greater deterrence than the holding of Actavis
provides. For instance, one particular generic drug company, Barr
Pharmacueticals, has been at the forefront of two massive pay-for-delay
agreements that have been discussed in this Note.277 This is just one example
of the serial behavior brand-name and generic drug companies can
demonstrate in regards to these agreements.
Accordingly, pay-for-delay settlements should be found to violate South
Carolina's prohibition against unfair trade practices because the practice of
stifling generic competition and artificially controlling the price of a brand-
name drug is patently unfair.
2. Procedural Analysis Under § 39-5-20
The SCUTPA provides for both private and public action against hose
who violate its prohibition against acts or practices that are patently
278unfair. Importantly, the procedural mechanism of the SCUTPA in terms
of enforcing its provisions are incredibly strong. On the public side, the
Attorney General has the power, whenever he has reasonable cause to
believe a violation of § 39-5-20 has occurred, to bring an action in the South
Carolina Court of Common Pleas in the name of the State requesting a
temporary or permanent injunction against the respective unfair or deceptive
trade practice.279 To aid in establishing that reasonable cause exists, the
Attorney General has the power to conduct an investigation into a company
to see if it has conducted or is planning on conducting activities that would
276. See GENERIC PHARM. Ass'N, supra note 37, at 4.
277. Barr Pharmaceuticals was one of the generic companies at issue in the Cipro case,
discussed extensively above. See In re Cipro Cases I & II, 61 Cal. 4th 116, 348 P.3d 845
(2015), reh'g denied (July 8, 2015). Barr Pharmaceuticals was also involved in the Provigil
pay-for-delay agreement entered into with Cephalon. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n,
supra note 8.
278. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 39-5-50-140 (2015).
279. Id. § 39-5-50.
2017] 739
51
Prince: Pay-for-Delay: How Brand-Name and Generic Pharmaceutical Drug Com
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
violate the SCUTPA.280 To this end, the Attorney General may issue
subpoenas to such companies requesting pertinent information and, in some
281instances, even conduct an actual hearing. If a company fails to comply
282with the subpoena, it faces a civil penalty of up to five thousand dollars.
The Attorney General has additional powers in enforcing injunctions and
recovering penalties on behalf of the State in private lawsuits. Any company
that violates the terms of an injunction is fined fifteen-thousand dollars per
283violation, payable to the State. Even in private lawsuits, the Attorney
General has the power, upon a finding that the company has willfully
engaged in an unfair trade practice, to petition the court and impose a civil
284penalty of five-thousand dollars per violation. For purposes of these
procedures, a company willfully engages in an unfair trade practice when it
285knows or should know that its conduct is a violation of § 39-5-20. The
Attorney General also has the power, if good cause is shown, to dissolve or
286suspend a corporation if it violates the terms of an injunction. In addition,
the Attorney General may force the forfeiture of any franchise or charter of a
287company for such violations. To aid the Attorney General in his efforts,
the solicitors of each judicial circuit and all county and city attorneys may,
with prior approval by the Attorney General, initiate litigation against
offending companies in the Common Pleas courts.288
In addition to these strong public remedies, the SCUTPA also provides a
private cause of action for willful violations of the Act. According to its
provisions, any individual who suffers any ascertainable loss of money or
property as a result of an unfair or deceptive trade practice declared unlawful
289by § 39-5-20 may institute an action to recover damages. Should the court
determine that a willful violation has occurred, the court must award three
times the actual damages ustained and also may provide any other relief it
290deems necessary or proper. In addition, the winning plaintiff is awarded
reasonable attorneys' fees and litigation costs.291 Although the statutory
language uses the term "individual," there is no statutory bar to class action
280. Id. § 39-5-70.
281. Id. § 39-5-80.
282. Id. § 39-5-100.
283. Id. § 39-5-110.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. § 39-5-120.
287. Id.
288. Id. § 39-5-130.
289. Id. § 39-5-140.
290. Id.
291. Id.
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suits for violations of the SCUTPA, nor is any such bar elucidated in South
Carolina case law.
Clearly, the procedural causes of action arising from violations of South
Carolina's statutory prohibition of unfair trade practices are the strongest of
the statutes analyzed in this Note. On the public side, the Attorney General
has a wide array of enforcement mechanisms at his disposal, including
subpoena power, initiating investigations, initiating litigation, and enforcing
injunctions. On the private side, the ability for injured consumers to recover
treble damages cannot be understated in its importance. This, combined with
the lack of any bar on class action suits, gives individual consumers on the
private side very strong enforcement mechanisms.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, this Note recommends that both private and
public litigation be pursued against brand-name drug companies
participating in pay-for-delay agreements that affect pharmaceutical drug
sales within the state of South Carolina. In terms of which South Carolina
statutory provisions to allege violations under, there is nothing prohibiting a
single lawsuit containing a cause of action for violations of each of the
relevant provisions discussed above. Put differently, a single complaint,
whether filed by the Attorney General, the Solicitor, an individual consumer,
292or a class of consumers, may contain separate counts alleging violation of
South Carolina's prohibition of: illegal antitrust activity; monopolies; illegal
restraints of trade; and unfair or deceptive trade practices. Indeed, several
lawsuits at the federal level attacking pay-for-delay agreements have done
just that. In this way, the State or the plaintiff will be able to litigate a claim
against the offending corporation under each statute and will also be able to
recover on any one of the four alleged counts should they be successful.
If a plaintiff instead wants to focus the court's attention only on the
strongest of claims under the South Carolina statutes, this Note suggests that,
due to its relative substantive and procedural strengths, an action brought
under the SCUTPA would carry the highest likelihood of success.
292. The antitrust count could not be attached to a complaint filed by a class of
consumers. See General Supplies, Inc. v. Southwire Co., 276 S.C. 55, 59, 275 S.E.2d 579, 581
(1981) ("Absent a statutory direction to the contrary, the personal remedy provided for at
Section 39-3-30 may not be sought through a class suit.").
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V. CONCLUSION
To conclude, South Carolina courts should consider reverse payment
patent settlements between branded and generic drug companies illegal per
se because they should be found to violate several different provisions of the
South Carolina statutory code. Pay-for-delay agreements have a devastating
economic effect on both South Carolina consumers and consumers across
the nation. Actavis has opened the door for states and consumers to attack
the legality of these agreements, and South Carolina should follow the lead
of California and protect its consumers by asserting claims against offending
corporations under each of the South Carolina statutes analyzed and
discussed above. Individual consumers can also take the lead by asserting
their rights as consumers through private litigation. By attacking pay-for-
delay agreements with both public and private litigation, South Carolina will
be at the forefront of a major national issue that locally impacts the average
family every single day.
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